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Abstract
We ask under what conditions transmission contracts increase or mitigate market power.
We show that the allocation process of transmission rights is crucial. In an efficiently arbi-
traged uniform price auction generators will only obtain contracts that mitigate their market
power. However, if generators inherit transmission contracts or buy them in a ‘pay-as-bid’
auction, then these contracts can enhance market power. In the two-node network case ban-
ning generators from holding transmission contracts that do not correspond to delivery of
their own energy mitigates market power. Meshed networks differ in important ways as con-
strained links no longer isolate prices in competitive markets from market manipulation. The
paper suggests ways of minimising market power considerations when designing transmission
contracts.
1 Introduction
Limited transmission capacity has been an impediment to creating competitive electricity mar-
kets in Europe and the United States. In many cases the interconnection capacity between
regions or countries was developed to provide security rather than to facilitate energy trade. In
liberalised markets where consumers are free to buy from out-of-area generators, this capacity
is often inadequate and must be rationed or priced. Transmission constraints isolate electricity
markets and limit the number of generators competing to supply local consumers. Increasing
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interconnector capacity has an additional advantage as it reduces local market power (Joskow
and Schmalensee, 1983). In many European countries, the concentration in generation is con-
siderable, and the dominant producer is required to produce for a large fraction of the year to
make up any shortfall between demand and available supply from imports and other producers.
As the short-run elasticity of electricity demand is extremely low, dominant producers have very
substantial market power when they are the required residual supplier. The Californian electric-
ity crisis of December 2000 provides stark evidence that market power can be a serious problem
in tight markets even when they appear unconcentrated (Joskow and Kahn, 2002) .
Mitigating market power is therefore high on the agenda for regulators on both sides of
the Atlantic. In the longer run, increased interconnection will reduce effective concentration,
as should entry by new generating companies, and possibly regulatory pressure encouraging
divestment, as in Britain. In the short run, though, interconnection capacity is limited and fixed.
When the transmission constraints are binding then transmission capacity becomes valuable and
revenues from financial transmission contracts or exercise of physical transmission rights influence
generators’ production decisions. The key policy question that this paper addresses is how such
scarce interconnection capacity should be made available to minimise the damaging effects of
market power of current levels of generation concentration. We are specifically concerned with
the design of auctions and markets (both spot and contract) to mitigate market power.
In a nodal pricing system, or where interconnection connects neighboring areas facing differ-
ent spot markets, transmission constraints expose market participants to locational price differ-
ences. Transmission contracts provide access to scarce transmission lines and provide financial
hedges against price risk. In addition, prices provide information to guide the expansion of trans-
mission capacity (Hogan, 1992). One immediate question confronting regulators is whether, and
if so, under what conditions, transmission contracts increase or mitigate the market power of
electricity generators.
The literature on the analysis of market power in transmission networks has developed in a
series of papers addressing particular problems. These provide considerable insight, though the
robustness of their findings and the implications for network management and market design are
rather scattered and hard to assess. The paper therefore aims to present a systematic analysis
of the best way to mitigate market power in constrained networks. This question provides a
natural and important organising principle for investigating the effects of different arrangements
on generator behaviour and consumer welfare.
Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (2000) show that it can be profitable for generators to with-
hold output in order to constrain a transmission line that would not have been constrained under
perfect competition. Borenstein et al (1996) cite empirical evidence for Northern California to
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this effect. Oren (1997) presents an alternative scenario with the transmission constraint located
between two strategic generators in a three-node network. Stoft (1998) solves the corresponding
Cournot game and Joskow and Tirole (2000) give the interpretation: the transmission configura-
tion can turn the outputs of generators at two different nodes into ‘local complements’, thereby
increasing the incentive for a generator to withhold output, as this constrains the output of
the other generator and increases price levels. Hogan (1997) shows if strategic generators own
generation assets at node A and B of a three node network, then they might increase output
at node A relative to a competitive scenario if loop flows reduce the total energy delivered and
increase prices at node B. Harvey and Hogan (2000) compare market power under nodal and
zonal congestion management and conclude that the impact of market power is always weakly
lower under nodal pricing than if both nodes are aggregated into a single zone. Further ef-
fects of market power in networks are addressed by Neuhoff (2003) modelling the separation of
markets for physical transmission capacity and energy spot markets for unconstrained, partially
constrained and constrained links. He concludes that market power is mitigated if the separate
markets are combined in a nodal design or market-splitting approach.
An additional dimension is added if generators own and/or bid for transmission contracts. To
maintain simplicity this paper only addresses situations when constraints are binding irrespective
of the existence of contracts. Stoft (1999) shows that transmission contracts may curb market
power in a two-node network. In contrast Hogan (1997) presents an example of a strategic
generator with assets at two nodes of a three-node network where transmission contracts enhance
his market power. Joskow and Tirole (2000) show that a generator with assets at one node of
a three-node network can increase output beyond the competitive output to increase rents from
transmission contracts, with negative welfare effects.
Joskow and Tirole (2000), subsequently referred to as J&T, provide the most impressive and
comprehensive treatment of the effect of transmission contracts, on which much of this paper is
built. They provide an extensive analysis of the difference between physical and financial trans-
mission contracts. Bushnell (1999) argues that it is important to ensure that scarce transmission
capacity is not withheld, by imposing ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ conditions. This last point is widely ac-
cepted and practised by European regulators,1 though J&T further argue that it may be difficult
in practice to enforce such a policy. Assuming that ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ conditions are successfully
imposed, J&T show that in a two-node network with the transmission link constrained, there is
an equivalence between financial transmission contracts and physical transmission contracts. For
meshed networks J&T discuss the difficulties of implementing physical transmission contracts and
1For example, the Dutch electricity regulator has taken steps against companies that did not use all of the
transmission capacity allocated to them. See http://www.nma-dte.nl
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Neuhoff (2003) shows that financial transmission contracts based on nodal pricing are preferable
for reducing generators’ market power. Financial transmission contracts are also preferable in
temporarily unconstrained two-node and meshed networks. Trading arrangements required for
physical transmission contracts typically create additional constraints which reduce net-demand
elasticities generators face and thereby enhance their ability to exercise market power.
In their paper, J&T focus on the incentives that ownership of financial transmission contracts
provide to generators in constrained simple and meshed networks. We build on these assumptions
to provide a more comprehensive and robust range of cases, to assess the interaction between
allocation and re-trading of contracts, and to examine the choice of auction and market design.
Joskow and Tirole start with the two-node case with a single monopolist at one node facing
competitive generators at the other node, and give examples in which contracts either enhance
or mitigate market power. In our interpretation transmission contracts serve the same function
as forward contracts for energy. A transmission contract links the value of generation at one
node to the price at another node. If the price at the other node is given (or hedged in local spot
markets), then a transmission contract is a forward contract for energy.
If a dominant generator at an importing node imports energy with a transmission contract
and sells it in the local spot market, this will increase the total volume of energy he sells at
the spot market price and increases his incentive to withhold domestic output to increase spot
prices. Market power is therefore enhanced if importing generators hold transmission contracts.
In contrast, in a two-node network if an exporting generator holds transmission contracts he
can effectively pre-commit that part of his output, in the same way that selling in a forward
market would pre-commit output. As with other forms of contracting generator output, this is
pro-competitive as it reduces the fraction sold at the spot market price and hence the incentive
to influence the spot price. Transmission contracts held by exporting generators mitigate market
power. In two-node markets like Scotland-England or Germany-Netherlands the market power
can therefore be mitigated by restricting generators from buying transmission contracts that do
not correspond to delivery of energy from their power plants.
Joskow and Tirole also address the three-node network but conclude that “The difference
between the two-and three-node networks is, we feel, more quantitative than qualitative; . . . ”
(Joskow and Tirole, 2000, p. 479). However, loop flows in a meshed network make prices at
different nodes interdependent even if transmission constraints are binding. If a generator holds
a transmission contract to a node with a price that increases more due to withholding than the
price at the production node, then the incentive to withhold output is increased. Joskow and
Tirole showed that in a meshed network transmission contracts held by exporting generators can
enhance market power. We think that is a crucial difference to the two-node case where the same
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contracts always mitigate market power. Our main result for meshed networks (which includes
the two-node case) is that a perfectly arbitraged single-price auction ensures that contracts
never enhance and may mitigate market power. Traders value transmission contracts more
than generators because in their possession the contracts do not create additional production
inefficiencies in the energy market. As a result traders will secure all the contracts.
Joskow and Tirole analyse a pay-as-bid auction by the system operator for the monopoly
case. They show that generators play a mixed strategy in the pay-as-bid auction. We solve this
case explicitly and extend it to the more commonly encountered oligopoly case, which differs in
some important respects. Traders know only the expected distribution of generators’ bids. This
lack of information implies that traders can only arbitrage the price of transmission contracts in
expectation and therefore bid less aggressively than in a uniform price auction. Generators then
obtain variable amounts of transmission contracts that increase their market power.
Uniform price auctions seem preferable to pay-as-bid auctions as they allow traders to ar-
bitrage away the extra market power that transmission contracts offer generators. However,
one should be cautious before accepting that uniform price auctions suffice to address market
power problems. The result only applies to the full information case and it remains an open
question whether it would still apply with asymmetric information or uncertainty. The result
also depends on the assumption that the energy spot market equilibrium price is predictable, as
it is with Cournot competition and information about cost and demand characteristics (of the
kind normally available to informed participants in electricity markets). If the energy market is
modelled as a supply function equilibrium as in Green and Newbery (1992), then the Nash equi-
librium in bidding strategies is no longer unique. As a result the value of transmission contracts
to traders is uncertain. In that case the outcome may share some of the unfavorable outcomes
of the pay-as-bid auction: traders bid less aggressively, allowing generators to obtain market
power-enhancing contracts.
The working assumption of Cournot competition in that sense is most favorable for a regula-
tory minimalist approach to market intervention. Competition in supply functions might create
uncertainty and information asymmetries, limiting the effectiveness of uniform price auctions.
Whilst careful auction design can reveal private information and therefore reduce these infor-
mation asymmetries, it may be more direct to use a simple auction design and explicitly ban
generators from obtaining certain types of transmission contracts.
Joskow and Tirole discuss surveillance of ‘gambling’ behavior of generators to mitigate the
risk that contracts may enhance market power. They conclude that ’regulatory surveillance of
transmission-rights ownership that turns on ‘gambling’ or ‘underhedging’ behavior is likely to
be difficult to implement under many real-world supply situations.’ (J&T p. 469) Our analysis
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suggests that one possible solution could be to identify the reference network node whose price
is least influenced by any generator’s output decision, and to define all transmission contracts
towards that node. Generators would be restricted to buying transmission contracts towards
this reference node. If such a node can be identified (and to be useful its identity would need to
be relatively stable over defined time periods), then all contracts should mitigate market power
and our aim would have been achieved. Consumers can buy transmission contracts from the
reference node to their off-take node such that the entire transmission risk is eliminated.
The paper also examines another related and practically important issue of trading in con-
tracts.2 Industry restructuring resulted in various legacy interconnection contracts held by gen-
erators and likewise discriminatory auctions allow generators to obtain contracts that enhance
market power. An important question is whether subsequent trade in these contracts would
resolve that problem. A monopolist would not sell contracts that enhance his market power.
Whether oligopolists sell contracts depends both on the trading structure and on the initial allo-
cation of contracts. If a well-defined final trading period exists then oligopolists will always sell
some of their market power-enhancing contracts. If their initial contract holding is symmetric
and sufficient trading periods exist, they will sell all these contracts. If retrading is possible
after a discriminatory auction, then generators will sell some, but not all, of the contracts they
obtained in the auction. However, this will not necessarily improve the final outcome, because it
can induce generators to bid more frequently for transmission rights. We therefore conclude that
contract trading does not in general resolve the problem of an inappropriate initial allocation
of transmission contracts. Regulators should therefore consider the market power implications
when grandfathering and auctioning contracts.
2 Energy market with importer market power
We assume that perfectly competitive generators with constant marginal costs c1 are net ex-
porters of electricity from node one. At node two, a total of n generators compete strategically
and face convex demand. A transmission link with capacity K connects the nodes. (Figure 1).
At stage one of the game, transmission contracts are allocated either according to some
rule (e.g. as legacy contracts) or in an auction. At stage two the market design could allow
generators to re-trade transmission contracts. At stage three generators determine their outputs
in the energy spot market. This replicates the current market structure in European countries
where transmission auctions close before the spot market closes.
2Joskow and Tirole assess the case of one trader holding all contracts. If these contracts can enhance the
market power of a monopolist generator and bilateral trade is possible, then the trader will sell all contracts to
the generator. (J&T p. 459)
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K
Figure 1: Oligopoly importing case
We solve the model backwards, starting in this section with the energy market. We assume
that the transmission link is always used at full capacity so output decisions at node two do not
influence prices at node one, which stay constant at marginal cost c1. The price at node two
depends on total supply, made up of imports K and local production Q =
∑
i qi:
p2 = P2(Q+K), p2,comp > c1. (1)
The generators choose output to maximise the profits, πi, they obtain from selling energy in the
local spot market, plus the revenue from their transmission contracts ki:
πspoti (qi, ki) = P2qi −Ci(qi) + ki (P2 − c1) , (2)
where Ci(q) is total cost. The first order condition for the choice of qi is
p2 −C′i(qi) + (qi + ki)
dP2
dQ
dQ
dqi
= 0, (3)
(where dQ/dqi captures a range of imperfectly competitive responses). From this
qi + ki =
p2 −C′i
−dP2
dQ
.dQ
dqi
. (4)
Transmission contracts are also held by competitive traders or consumers. Compare two alloca-
tions, the second of which is identical to the first except that generator i has an additional ∆
transmission contracts, and traders or consumers have ∆ fewer in total. If ki increases to ki+∆,
we wish to argue that then qi necessarily decreases and so does Q. It is tempting to argue that
the second step follows from a stability condition, for if by increasing qi, Q were to fall then the
price would rise, making further increases in qi even more profitable. That line of argument is
in general invalid, as it ignores the time sequence of decisions. The change in ki happens before
agents choose their output decisions, and they condition on that as well as the presumed output
choices of other generators. To make further progress, we can either assume that output choices
are Nash-Cournot (NC, dQ/dqi = 1), or that
dQ
dqi
is constant (as would arise with a linear supply
function model with linear marginal costs and linear demand).
Consider first the NC case, with dQ/dqi = 1 in (3). During the reallocation of transmission
contracts, (3) has to be satisfied, and can therefore be differentiated with respect to kj :(
(qi + ki)P
′′
2 + P
′
2
) dQ
dkj
+ δijP
′
2 +
(
P ′2 −C ′′i (qi)
) dqi
dkj
= 0, (5)
7
where δij takes the value 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. This can be rearranged to give
dqi
dkj
=
δijP
′
2 + [(qi + ki)P
′′
2 + P
′
2]
dQ
dkj
−[P ′2 −C ′′i (qi)]
. (6)
The denominator of (6) is positive as P ′2 is negative, and efficient plant dispatch implies that
C′′i (qi) ≥ 0. If P ′′2 (qi + ki) + P ′2 is negative, then it must follow that dQ/dkj < 0. For suppose
not, then dqi/dkj < 0, for all i, from (6), but
dQ
dkj
=
∑ dqi
dkj
, giving a contradiction. Clearly
P ′′2 (qi + ki) + P
′
2 is negative for concave or linear demand, for then P
′′
2 ≤ 0, but the second
order condition from (6) by itself is not sufficient to show that it is negative more generally.
Nevertheless, the conditions for dQ/dkj < 0 are quite weak.
First consider the case of constant marginal costs: C′′i (qi) = 0. Sum (6) over i after dividing
by −P ′2:
dQ
dkj
= −1−
(
n− (Q+
∑
ki)
P ′′2
−P ′2
)
dQ
dkj
. (7)
It follows that dQ/dkj < 0 if
QP ′′2
−P ′2
< (n+ 1)
Q
Q+
∑
ki
, (8)
which is a weak condition on the degree of convexity of the demand schedule.
Alternatively, if marginal costs are increasing, consider symmetric generators and transmis-
sion contracts. Summing (6) over all i gives
dQ
dkj
=
P ′2
C′′i (qi)− n(qi + ki)P ′′2 − (n+ 1)P ′2
, (9)
which is negative for
QP ′′2
−P ′2
<
(
n+ 1 +
C′′i (qi)
−P ′2
)
Q
Q+ nki
. (10)
For constant marginal costs the condition coincides with the condition for asymmetric generators
(8), while the condition is less stringent than (8) for increasing marginal costs, C ′′i (qi) > 0.
If output decisions respond not just to transmission contract holdings, but conjectures about
other generators’ responses, the denominator in (4) may change in unpredictable ways without
further conditions. Of these the simplest is that generators have linear marginal costs, face linear
demands, and submit linear supply function bids, as in Green (1993) , specifying the quantity
qi(p) = q0i + τp they are prepared to provide at price p. In that case the denominator in (4)
is constant, independent of ki, and the analysis goes through much as before. The derivation
is straightforward but slightly tedious. With linear demand and linear symmetric marginal
costs, Appendix A shows that total output
∑
i qi is decreasing in the amount of transmission
contracts held by generators,
∑
i ki. In a supply function equilibrium generators choose the price
responsiveness of their output, τ , together with q0,i. In our model with zero uncertainty the
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only equilibrium will be the Nash Cournot case τ = 0, already considered. The parameter τ
can therefore be considered as determined by the degree of competitiveness and the extend of
demand variation/uncertainty.
As generators with market power already reduce output relative to the competitive equilib-
rium, the reduction of output due to transmission contracts induces a further deviation from the
competitive (welfare optimal) equilibrium. This result is summarised in the following Proposi-
tion, which reinforces results in J&T:
Proposition 1 In a two-node capacity-constrained network, transmission contracts enhance the
market power of importing generators in the spot market and reduce total output if demand is
linear, or if either marginal costs are constant or if firms are symmetric, and the convexity of
demand is less than a critical level.
In general an oligopoly generator values the marginal transmission contract less than a
trader. If a generator owns more transmission contracts, then he will withhold more output and
thereby increase prices, benefiting both the trader and generator. However, unlike the trader, the
generator foregoes the revenue on the marginal unit of output and therefore values the market
power-enhancing transmission contract less then a trader. He will therefore be outbid in any
efficient market for transmission contracts. To see this, observe that generator i’s profit in the
spot market is given by (2):
πspoti (qi, ki) = (qi + ki)P2 −Ci(qi)− kic1,
so that the marginal value of additional transmission contracts is:
dπspoti (ki)
dki
=
dqi
dki
[
p2 −C ′i(qi)
]
+ (qi + ki)P
′
2
dQ
dki
+ p2 − c1.
Substituting from (6) and using (3) gives
dπspoti (ki)
dki
=
(
p2 −C′i(qi)
) P ′2 + ((qi + ki)P ′′2 + 2P ′2 −C ′′i (qi)) dQdki
−[P ′2 −C ′′i (qi)]
+ p2 − c1.
Substituting from (5) gives:
dπspoti (ki)
dki
=
(
p2 −C′i(qi)
)(dqi
dki
− dQ
dki
)
+ p2 − c1. (11)
In (11) the marginal value of a transmission contract for a generator is less than the value p2−c1
the contract has for a trader if dqidki <
dQ
dki
. That condition is satisfied for constant marginal costs
C′′i = 0 with a slightly enhanced convexity condition than (8):
QP ′′2
−P ′2
< (n− 1) Q
Q+
∑
ki − qi − ki . (12)
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For symmetric generators with increasing marginal costs, (10) is slightly strengthened to
QP ′′2
−P ′2
< n
Q
Q+ nki
.
The intuition is that a generator obtaining additional contracts will replace some production by
imports: dqidki < 0. The remaining generators face a larger market and typically increase output
dqi
dkj
> 0 for j = i. Therefore dQ
dki
− dqi
dki
=
∑
i=l
dqi
dki
> 0 and the marginal value of transmission
contracts is less for a generator than for a trader.
3 Retrading Transmission Contracts
If, as was common in Europe after the restructuring of the electricity supply industry, generators
inherit legacy contracts, or if generators obtain contracts in a discriminatory price auction, the
previous section showed that they will reduce output relative to the situation in which they
have no transmission contracts. Total welfare losses are increased as production decisions are
further distorted. If, however, generators can resell transmission contracts before the energy
spot market opens, then it is important to see whether efficient arbitrage again eliminates this
additional inefficiency.
We start with an initial allocation of import contracts in the hands of generators at the
importing node. If these generators sell the contracts, then market power is mitigated. To
properly model the electricity market it is important to notice that electricity flows in opposite
directions cancel each other. In our two-node network, exports from the importing node increase
the total amount of transmission capacity available for imports, because only the net amount of
energy transmitted is subject to the transmission constraint. A system operator could therefore
issue additional import contracts for node two if the same amount of export contracts from node
two are requested, provided that export contracts are explicit obligations. The trader obtaining
the export contracts is then obliged to schedule a transmission from the high price (net importing)
node two towards the lower price (net exporting) node and hence receive a positive payment along
with the transmission contract (obligation). If such netting were allowed, then our generator at
the importing node could not only sell all his import contracts, but could start buying export
contracts and thereby further mitigate his market power.
Typically transmission operators are concerned that they could not recover the high costs
incurred for last minute balancing of the system, if traders fail to schedule the exports. Therefore
most interconnection market designs do not yet include netting, although the regulator has been
studying the feasibility of netting on the Dutch-German interconnection. Generators can buy
export contracts up to the amount of the transmission capacity but will not receive any payment
for the contracts. We assume that the import constraint is binding and the price at the importing
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node is above the price at the exporting node. Given that the marginal cost of exporting is above
the competitive node’s price, generators will not use their export contracts and ownership of
export contracts will have no effect on the output decision of generators. We therefore assume,
unless otherwise stated, that generators will not buy export contracts.
We assume rational expectations so that generators and traders anticipate the outcome and
price in the subsequent energy market.
3.1 Oligopoly case with one firm that owns transmission contracts
Consider an oligopoly in which only one firm, i, holds transmission contracts. Suppose there are
r trading periods. Initially, firm i has kri transmission contracts. In each period, firm i sells
∆j contracts, with
r∑
j=1
∆j = kri − k0i . The profit from the sale of contracts and the energy spot
market is:
πri = qi(k
0
i )(p2(k
0
i )− c2) +
r∑
j=1
∆j(p2(k
0
i )− c1),
= qi(k
0
i )(p2(k
0
i )− c2) + (kri − k0i )(p2(k0i )− c1). (13)
The first term is the profit from spot energy sales, which depends on firm i’s final holding of
transmission contracts. The second term is the profit from sales of transmission contracts, which
also depends on the firm’s final holding.
The FOC of equation (13) with respect to k0i has a unique solution k
∗0
i = k
∗0
i (k
r
i ) given by
k∗0i +
p2(k∗0i )− c1
∂p2(k∗0i )
∂k0i
− qi(k∗0i ) = kri . (14)
If firm i could commit to sales in each period, it would sell the optimal amount kri − k∗0i and
its profit would be independent of the timing of its sales. Without commitment, firm i can
maximise its profit by selling kri − k∗0i in the final period, j = 1. If it sells an amount ∆ before
the final period, then it will sell
k∗0i +
p2(k∗0i )− c1
∂p2(k∗0i )
∂k0i
− qi(k∗0i ) = kri −∆
in the final period, where k∗0i = k
∗0
i (k
r
i −∆). In general,
k∗0i (k
r
i −∆) +∆ = k∗0i (kri ),
and therefore profits are lower than with commitment, which can be sustained by selling only
in the final period. Appendix B demonstrates this for Cournot case with linear demand and
constant marginal cost. Hence, if a single firm owns transmission contracts and there are r > 1
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trading periods, the firm will sell transmission contracts only in the final trading period. This
corresponds to the monopolist in Allaz and Vila (1993) not falling into the forward selling trap.
The Appendix shows for the case of an n-firm oligopoly with only one firm holding transmission
contracts that
∆1 =
n− 1
2n
(Qcomp + k
r
i ) .
Note that a monopolist (n = 1) will not sell any contracts. Summarizing:
Proposition 2 If only one generator holds k transmission contracts and netting is not possible
then the generator will sell ∆ = min(n−12n (Qcomp + k) , k) contracts in the last of a finite number
of trading periods with Qcomp being the competitive output of all generators. A monopolist will
not sell any contracts.
3.2 Oligopoly case with many firms that own transmission contracts
As before, assume there are r trading periods and let kr be the vector of initial transmission
holdings. The profit for firm i from sales of transmission contracts is
πri = qi(
k0)(p2(k
0)− c2) + (kri − k0i )(p2(k0)− c1).
Firm i’s profit is an increasing function of k0j for j = i because transmission contracts held by
importing generators enhance market power and lead to higher prices. Conditional on k0j for
j = i, firm i’s profit-maximizing sale of transmission contracts is given by the analog to equation
(14),
k∗0i +
p2(k
0)− c1
∂p2(k0)
∂k0i
− qi(k0) = kri . (15)
However, firm iwould be better off if it could force competing generators to sell fewer transmis-
sion contracts. Why then do generators sell transmission contracts that enhance their market
power? A monopolist would not sell contracts, indicating that selling contracts reduces aggregate
oligopolist profit. It is caused by the ‘failure’ of oligopolists to commit to not selling. The more
opportunities are available to ‘cheat’ on competitors, the more contracts generators will sell and
the more market power will be mitigated.
The previous section showed that if only one of many generators owns transmission con-
tracts, then he would only sell contracts in the last retrading period. The energy spot market
relevant for the output decisions of oligopolists is the local energy demand plus their holdings
of import contracts. By selling some of his import contracts, a generator captures some of this
market and then competes for the remaining market on an equal basis with the other generators.
His total sale volume, consisting of contract sales, and contracts plus energy volume in the spot
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market, is increased and outweighs the effect of lower prices. Prices are reduced because gener-
ators have less incentive to withhold output and therefore total energy spot market production
increases. Summarising: the generator sells his contracts in the last retrading period to induce
his competitors to sell less in the energy spot market. It is not attractive to sell in earlier periods
as traders would offer lower prices, anticipating further sales in the final period. As the generator
is the sole seller of contracts he can commit not to sell until the last period.
If several generators own transmission contracts, then all generators will sell transmission
contracts in the last trading period: They can not commit jointly not to sell, and the previous
argument also applies to each generator individually: Selling contracts induces competitors to sell
less in the energy spot market and thereby increases individual profits relative to individually not
selling. However, now generators are also oligopolists during the earlier periods of re-trading and
will no longer wait for the last retrading period to sell transmission contracts. By selling contracts
in the next to last re-trading period, a generator reduces the aggregate energy and contract
market his competitors face in the last re-trading period and thereby reduces the competitors’
sale of contracts in the last re-trading period. This increases his sales volume and market share
in the overall transmission contract and energy market and outweighs the reduction in prices due
to reduced exercise of market power. Therefore a generator already starts selling transmission
contracts in the next to last retrading period, and so do all his competitors. This argument
equally applies to all previous trading periods.
The more trading periods exist, the more transmission contracts will be sold by generators.
Assume that netting is possible, generators can start buying export contracts once they have
sold all their import contracts. With increasing number of trading periods generators sell all
import contracts and buy sufficient export contracts, such that they get arbitrarily close to
matching all their output in the energy spot market with contracts. The Appendix provides an
algebraic proof for the symmetric Cournot case with linear demand and constant marginal cost,
generalising Allaz and Vila ’s (1993) duopoly case. The intuition is that there is no other limit
at which generators would stop selling or buying contracts, and so generators forward contract
almost all output and bid almost competitively in the energy spot market. Figure 2 shows for
a finite number of trading periods, e.g. six, generators will reduce their transmission contract
holding in each period and then buy export contracts that mitigate market power.3
If netting is not permitted, then this introduces a new limit - generators can only sell
their import contracts but will not obtain export contracts. The grey shaded area in Figure
3 In GNN we show that if trading takes place in continuous time with no obvious last trading period, and if
either only one generator holds contracts, or symmetric oligopolists hold the same amount of contracts but can
only observe if any contracts have been sold, then there is an equilibrium in which no contracts are sold.
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Figure 2: Contract sales by sole-owning oligopoly generator
2 illustrates that generators could start to resell contracts earlier. For our purpose it is not
important when they resell. It suffices to conclude, that given a sufficient number of trading
periods, generators with symmetric holding of transmission contracts will resell all market power-
enhancing transmission contracts. In the energy spot market import contracts have the same
influence on the profit function of a generator as does his own output sold in the energy market.
It is therefore a smooth change from generators without transmission contracts to generators
holding some contracts, and the limit does not create new constraints that could enable oligopolist
generators to use new strategies. The results from the situation with netting apply: within a
finite number r trading periods generators will sell all their import contracts. If more than r
trading periods exist, then we are not interested in the sales of contracts in the initial periods. It
suffices to know that eventually only r periods are left within which the generators will certainly
sell all remaining contracts.
Proposition 3 If a finite number of well-defined trading periods exists, symmetric generators
will sell a finite volume of market power-enhancing transmission contracts and with sufficient
trading periods they will sell all their market power-enhancing contracts. If netting is possible,
then generators subsequently start buying market power mitigating transmission contracts and will
in the limit forward contract all their output as the number of trading period tends to infinity.
3.3 Continuous retrading possible
The previous paragraphs assumed that generators trade at well-defined trading events and can
therefore not condition their sales on simultaneous sales of fellow generators. If instead we
assume continuous trading, then at any time only one generator sells transmission contracts and
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so all subsequent sales can be conditioned on this sale. Furthermore continuous trading in an
open interval ensures that there is always time for additional sales. We assume that the whole
trading interval is short enough such that generators and traders do not discount prices during
the period. This allows us to abstract from time and look only at the sequence of trading events.
Assume n generators own symmetric amounts k of transmission contracts. Any generator
can determine in an open time interval whether to sell transmission contracts to a trader. A
generator will either sell all his transmission contracts or keep all of his transmission contracts,
because profits are increasing in the volume of contracts sold. Figure 3 shows the game structure
of arbitrary, symmetric, generators selling in reaction to previous sales and in anticipation of
potential subsequent sales. The game will be solved backwards.
hold
n
m+2
hold
hold
hold
hold
hold
m
1
m
h
m+1
..sell
sell
sell
sell
sell
sell
1
time
j
Decision faced by any one
of j generators with
transmission contracts
Figure 3: The game players face when re-trading continuously. At each moment only one gener-
ator decides whether to sell his contracts.
Proposition 10, in appendix C, shows that the last generator (number 1) always sells his
contracts iff the previous (n− 1) generators already sold their contracts. Using backward induc-
tion one can show that the last m generators also sell their contracts if the previous (n −m)
generators have sold their contracts. If (n−m− 1) generators have already sold their contracts,
then it is not profitable for generatorm+1 to sell his contracts, because he only obtains the price
transmission contracts obtain if no generator holds contracts. Therefore m+ 1 generators hold-
ing transmission contracts is an equilibrium outcome. Appendix C shows that m+1 generators
typically represent 50%-60% of all generators and therefore never more than half of transmission
contracts will be re-sold.
If more than m+1 generators hold transmission contracts, than proposition 11 shows, that
it is profitable for a generator to sell transmission contracts if he is one out of m + 1 + h′,
15
with 1 ≤ h′ ≤ h generators holding contracts. He will obtain the price contracts take, if m+ 1
generators continue to hold contracts. For n ≤ 7 generators we obtain the result thatm+h+1 ≥ n
and so it is profitable for the first n−m−1 generators to sell their transmission contracts, while
m+ 1 generators will retain their contracts.
Starting with n = 8 and depending on the size of total transmission contracts held relative
to total competitive output we can find situations withm+1+h+1 = n when it is not profitable
for the first generator to sell his transmission contracts because it will trigger h other generators
to follow. In this case all transmission contracts are retained.
3.3.1 Continuous retrading with one generator owning transmission
Whilst it is possible for several generators to inherit legacy transmission contracts, the outcome
of a pay-as-bid auction to be described below is that only one generator will secure contracts (the
probability of two independently randomizing bidders choosing the same constant bid price for
all capacity is zero). The same question arises whether this generator will resell the transmission
contracts acquired in the auction.
If an oligopolist sells ∆i of its contracts, the extra profit is:
∆πsell∆i = π
spot
ki−∆i
− πspotki +∆i (p2,k−∆ − c1)
∆πsell∆i =
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
(kj −∆j)
α (n+ 1)
∆i − 2
n+ 1
n∑
j=1
∆j
−
(
n∑
j=1
∆j
)2
α (n+ 1)2
. (16)
Setting kj = ∆j = 0, ∀j = i in (16) it follows that the generator only profits from a sale (πsell∆i > 0)
if he sells fewer transmission contracts than
∆i <
n− 1
n
(Qcomp + ki) . (17)
If several trading periods exist then traders buying transmission contracts from the oligopolist
fear that the oligopolist will sell additional transmission contracts in subsequent periods, reducing
the value of the transmission contracts. Again, the rational expectations equilibrium with no
obvious final selling period is that traders will only buy at the price these contracts take if the
generator sold all of them. This argument corresponds to Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner’s
(1994) analysis of takeovers: If no final trading period exists, then shareholders anticipate that a
raider will continue to buy shares, thereby increasing the value of the firm. Therefore they will
only sell at the value shares take, if the raider owns all shares, which might not be profitable for
the raider. It is profitable for the generator to sell all transmission contracts at once ∆i = ki in
(17) if and only if
ki < (n− 1)Qcomp.
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This is the opposite condition to that which will be presented in (E.1) for participating in the
pay-as-bid auction, so either generators will not bid and hence have nothing to sell, or will bid
and not subsequently sell. This is summarised in:
Proposition 4 If an oligopoly importer acquires transmission contracts in a pay-as-bid auction,
then it is not profitable to resell any contracts if there is no final trading period.
3.3.2 Continuous retrading with limited information flows
The previous section required that all traders and generators are instantaneously informed about
how many generators already sold their transmission contracts. In a bilateral market that is
certainly a strong assumption. Therefore we restrict the information flow and assume that only
one signal sǫ{0, 1} is publicly available, which indicates whether any transmission contracts have
been traded. This simplifies the strategy space of generators to the amount of transmission
contracts to sell before a sale signal ∆0,i, and the amount of transmission contracts to sell after
a sale signal ∆1,i (∆0,i). The previous section showed that if they sell at all, then generators sell
all rights at the same time, therefore ∆0,iǫ{0, k} and ∆1,iǫ{0, k}.
One equilibrium strategy is ∆1,i = k and ∆0,i = 0. If n −m other generators sell, then it
is profitable to join the crowd. (Proposition 10). However, anticipating that starting to sell will
trigger a general sell out, it is not profitable to sell. First, because any trader knows so, and
will only pay the low price transmission contracts take if all are sold to traders, and secondly,
because all other generators will sell their transmission contracts and increase output and thereby
reduce profits in the energy spot market. This can be seen by setting l = 0, j = n in (55) gives
∆πsl,j = k
(1−n)Qcomp−n2k
α(n+1)2
< 0.
Summarising, in a world with limited information there is an equilibrium in which symmetric
generators with symmetric holdings of transmission contracts will not sell any of these contracts
to traders.
Proposition 5 If additional sales are always possible and generators cannot buy negative quan-
tities of transmission contracts and if generators and traders only obtain information of whether
any generator sold transmission contracts, then there is an equilibrium in which generators will
not sell transmission contracts.
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4 Allocation of transmission contracts
4.1 Allocation in the Uniform Price Auction
Following the logic of solving the problem backward from energy spot market, to re-trading
of transmission contracts, we finally arrive in the period of initial allocation of transmission
contracts. In a single or uniform price auction with no uncertainty all bidders pay the market
clearing price. The market clearing price equals the predicted price difference between markets
and therefore generators cannot make profits on their transmission contracts.
Each generator submits a bid schedule defining the capacity ki (η) he is willing to buy at
price η and so do traders, represented by their aggregate bid schedule kt (η). The auctioneer
determines the market clearing price:
η∗ = max η satisfying
∑
i
ki (η) + kt (η) ≥ K. (18)
4.1.1 Traders’ bid schedules
We assume a perfectly contestable market with new traders entering if any arbitrage opportunity
exists. Therefore traders make zero profits and pay the auction price that corresponds to the value
contracts will have in the subsequent energy market. The value of these contracts is increasing
with the number of contracts held by generators or decreasing in the number of contracts held
by traders. In the aggregate bid schedule of traders price η is therefore decreasing in quantity
kt:
η = P2 (kt (η))− c1.
4.1.2 Generators’ bid schedules
Total profit of generators is given by profit in the energy market (2) less the cost for obtaining
transmission contracts. Due to arbitrage the price paid for transmission contracts equals the
spot price difference between the nodes and (2) simplifies to:
πcontracti = P2qi −C2(qi).
The first order condition with respect to ki, is:
dπi(ki)
dki
=
dP2
dQ
dQ
dki
qi +
(
p2 −C′2
) dqi
dki
. (19)
The equation differs from (5) because in the energy market transmission contracts were already
present and expenses sunk, whereas in (19) generators incorporate the costs of buying transmis-
sion contracts when determining the optimal holding. Substituting (p2 −C ′2) dqidki from FOC (3)
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gives
dπi(ki)
dki
=
dP2
dQ
(
qi
(
dQ
dki
− dQ
dqi
dqi
dki
)
− kidQ
dqi
dqi
dki
)
= 0. (20)
For a monopolist dQdki =
dQ
dqi
dqi
dki
and he will not hold any transmission contracts. To determine the
outcome with oligopolists, we assume Cournot competition with dQdqi = 1 and FOC (20) changes
to:
dπi(ki)
dki
=
dP2
dQ
(
qi
dQ
dki
− (ki + qi) dqi
dki
)
= 0. (21)
According to Proposition 1 dQ
dki
< 0, therefore oligopoly generators in equilibrium will buy a
negative amount of transmission contracts, if
dqi
dki
<
dQ
dki
. (22)
If the assumptions made in section 2 of constant marginal costs or symmetric generators apply,
then (22) will be satisfied.4 If we assume that netting is not possible so that generators cannot buy
negative amount of transmission contracts, then we obtain a boundary solution with dπi(ki)dki < 0
for ki = 0 and oligopolists will not buy market power-enhancing transmission contracts. This
result corresponds to Grossman and Hart (1980) observation, that a raider will not takeover a
firm (buy contracts), if he has to pay the price which shares take due to the improved management
and does therefore not capture the benefits of his activities.
If netting is feasible and oligopolists can buy a negative quantity of transmission contracts,
then they will do so. A negative quantity of transmission contracts corresponds to an energy
delivery in the opposite direction of the constraint. As energy flows superimpose in electricity
networks a reverse flow relieves congestion and is therefore valuable. Buying a negative quan-
tity of transmission contracts means receiving money in exchange for, in the case of physical
transmission contracts, the obligation to deliver energy, or in the case of financial contracts, the
obligation to pay the price difference in the energy spot markets.
If importing generators hold negative quantities of transmission contracts, corresponding to
flows against the direction in which the constraint is congested, then, according to (39), they
increase their output towards the competitive equilibrium output. Market power is mitigated.
4Condition (22) can be rewritten using (6) gives a condition for ki ≤ 0 to be:
[(qi + ki)P
′′
2 + 2P
′
2 − C
′′
i (qi)]
dQ
dki
< −P ′2. (23)
In the case of symmetric generators (9) gives:
(qi + ki)P
′′
2 + 2P
′
2 − C
′′
i (qi)
n(qi + ki)P ′′2 + (n+ 1)P
′
2 − C
′′
i (qi)
< 1.
The denominator is positive for the easily satisfied convexity condition (10). Likewise in the case of constant
marginal costs (7) equation (23) is satisfied for convexity condition (12).
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Netting negative flows against positive flows is therefore valuable, but as of 2002, most European
transmission auctions did not offer this facility, though it was under discussion. A financial
transmission contract should not face this difficulty. In the absence of financial transmission
contracts and if negative physical quantities cannot be issued, then the non-negativity constraint
implies that ki ≥ 0 and the optimal choice of importing generators is not to participate in a
uniform price auction: ki = 0.
The result is summarised in:
Proposition 6 Assume transmission is sold in a uniform price auction in a two-node capacity-
constrained network with no uncertainty about future equilibrium spot prices and traders perfectly
arbitrage transmission prices.
(i) With no financial contracts and no netting of transmission flows, ki = 0 for all i.
Arbitraging traders outbid importing generators with market power. (As suggested by J&T, p.
475)
(ii) With financial contracts and/or netting, symmetric importing generators will offer
negative import capacity or sell transmission contracts.
4.2 Pay-as-bid auction
Joskow and Tirole (2000) analysed a ‘pay-as-bid’ auction for a monopolist generator buying
transmission contracts. In Appendix D we derive the explicit solution for the monopolist case, and
extend it in Appendix E to the oligopoly case. In Europe most electricity transmission auctions
are uniform, but the France-England interconnector is auctioned pay-as-bid. In period one
generators and traders submit sealed bid schedules specifying the quantities they are prepared to
buy at different prices. The auctioneer determines the successful bids and allocates transmission
capacity and the spot market for energy clears in period two. Joskow and Tirole show that a
pure strategy equilibrium does not exist for this game. A monopoly generator bids with a mixed
strategy.
4.2.1 Result of the pay-as-bid auction
The results are summarised in Figure 4. The monopolist bid schedule η is drawn with uniform
probability over the interval ranging from the value transmission contracts take if the generator
owns no contracts to the value transmission contracts take if he owns all contracts. On average the
monopolist obtains half of the contracts. In the pay-as-bid auction with asymmetric information
traders sometimes bid too high and therefore risk losses. These losses are compensated by the
bids that are accepted below the value of the transmission contract. In expectation traders
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Figure 4: Bids and outcomes in pay-as-bid auction
therefore make zero profit. The marginal bid does not arbitrage prices in a pay-as-bid auction,
so the monopolist obtains transmission contracts below its market value to compensate for the
lost revenues on additional withheld output.
In the monopoly case the generator does not profit from obtaining transmission contracts
because traders increase their bids until the generator’s profits when obtaining transmission
contracts equal profits when he does not obtain transmission contracts. Appendix D shows that
in the oligopoly case, generators profit in expectation from the auction of transmission contracts.
This is because generators’ profits are increased relative to a situation without transmission
contracts if other generators obtain transmission contracts in the auction and reduce output.
Traders bid such that generators are indifferent between participating and not participating in
the auction.
The analysis so far ignores the possibility of retrading. It has no effect in the monopoly
case, because the monopolist does not sell transmission contracts. In an oligopoly with re-
trading in a finite number of trading periods, the single successful generator buying k rights in
the auction will sell ∆ = min(k,n−12n (Qcomp + k)) rights in the subsequent market. That affects
the value of contracts in the auction and it is no longer possible to derive algebraic solutions for
the auction bids. It is possible to numerically integrate the differential equations, without and
with subsequent retrading, given specific parameter values, as discussed in Appendix E. Figure
5 illustrates the results of the mixed strategy equilibrium for parameter values n = 2, α = 1,
K = 3 and Qcomp = 3/2.
Generators profit from reselling transmission contracts at a price above their successful bid.
This decreases the minimum profitable bid volume and increases the benefits of winning relative
to free-riding, with the increased market power exercised by the winning generator. As a result,
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Figure 5: Bid choice and outcomes in pay-as-bid auction with retrading
generators bid more frequently in the discriminatory auction. With re-trading the generator buys
contracts more frequently in the discriminatory auction (the dashed line of the cumulative density
function is lower), and so traders can also bid more aggressively and the generator obtains fewer
transmission contracts at a given price (see right part of figure). Allowing re-trading after a
discriminatory auction is not necessarily welfare improving as it changes the bids in the auction.
In our specific example expected monopoly rents from contracts obtained in the discriminatory
auction increase from 0.12 units to 0.27 units if retrading is possible. Furthermore efficiency
is reduced: the expected holding of transmission contracts by generators at the time of the
energy spot market (after potential retrading) increases from 0.38 to 0.51 (i.e. from 0.21Qcomp to
0.34Qcomp). This translates directly into withholding of more output and hence more inefficient
production decisions. In the example, the higher participation rates outweigh the benefits from
reselling market power-enhancing contracts during retrading.
We summarize these results in the following proposition which generalises J&T monopoly
case (J&T p. 461-462).
Proposition 7 Assume constant marginal costs and linear demand. If transmission is sold in
a pay-as-bid auction in a two-node capacity-constrained network where import capacity exceeds
(n − 1) times domestic competitive output, then importing generators with market power will
play a mixed strategy and secure some fraction of transmission contracts, enhancing their market
power.
5 Exporter market power in a two-node network
We briefly consider the case in which the oligopoly is located at the exporting node of a two-node
network (Figure 6). The importing node is assumed perfectly competitive with price p2 = c2.
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Figure 6: Oligopoly exporting case
The analysis parallels section 2, but as the direction of trade is exactly opposite, so too are the
results. The counterparts to (1) and (2) are
p1 = P1(Q−K), p1,comp < c2 = p2,
πi(qi, ki) = P1qi −Ci(qi) + ki(c2 − P1). (24)
Similarly, the counterpart to (6) is
dqi
dkj
=
−δijP1 + [(qi − ki)P ′′1 + P ′1] dQdkj
−[P ′1 −C ′′i (qi)]
. (25)
The same reasoning as in the importing case establishes that dQ/dki > 0, so transmission
contracts mitigate, rather than enhance, market power. This time exporting generators will
successfully bid against arbitrageurs, except in the monopoly case, as the next section shows.
5.1 Uniform price auction
Consider the case in which traders perfectly arbitrage the auction ensuring that πcontracti (ki) =
P1qi −Ci(qi). The counterpart to (20) is
dπspoti (ki)
dki
=
dP1
dQ
(
qi
(
dQ
dki
− dQ
dqi
dqi
dki
)
+ ki
dQ
dqi
dqi
dki
)
= 0. (26)
Again, for the same reason as in 4.1.2, a monopolist will not buy any contracts at the arbitraged
price. In the oligopoly case, (26) can be solved for ki :
0 < ki = qi
(
1− dQ/dki
dQ
dqi
dqi
dki
)
< qi,
provided that no more transmission contracts are demanded than are available,
∑
i ki ≤ K,
otherwise generators outbid all traders, and the auction clearing price η will be such that
∑
i ki =
K. Thus for the case of linear demand D = A = αP1, the optimal contract volume ki for each
of the n symmetric exporting oligopolistic generators is
ki =Min
(
n− 1
n2 + 1
(A+K − αc1) , K
n
)
=Min
(
n2 − 1
n2 + 1
qi,k=0,
K
n
)
. (27)
In a single price auction, exporting oligopoly generators (but not monopolists) secure some or all
of the available transmission contracts. As their spot energy output is increasing in their contract
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position (dQ/dki > 0) so transmission contracts mitigate, rather than enhance, market power.
These contracts mitigate market power by driving down the price at the export node below that
prevailing if generators are prevented from acquiring transmission contracts, while leaving the
price at node two unaffected (as the link is fully used in any case). Allowing generators to partic-
ipate in the auction and even foreclose the market is welfare improving. Transmission contracts
towards node two correspond to contracts for differences and so generators use the transmission
contracts to sell energy in the forward market. This corresponds to a second contracting stage
and makes the outcome more competitive, as in Newbery (1998). In that model, long-term
contracts are signed in period one, and the remaining energy is traded in the spot market in
period two. The more energy is covered by long-term contracts, the lower the exposure of gen-
erators to the spot-market price. Therefore they increase their output to obtain revenue on the
marginal unit at the cost of overall lower prices. Rational expectations imply that the expected
spot-market prices feed back to the long-term contract prices. The result shows that allowing
access to the transmission line decreases market power by serving as an initial contracting stage.
This general result confirms Stoft’s (1999) special case for zero demand elasticity at the import
node and the J&T (p. 472) result that price in the exporting region is reduced if a monopoly
generator holds transmission contracts.
Provided there is complete information about costs and demand and no uncertainty, the
pay-as-bid auction has the same equilibrium, because the oligopolistic generators use a pure
strategy. We summarise the result as:
Proposition 8 In a two-node capacity-constrained network, allowing exporting generators with
market power to buy transmission contracts is always welfare-enhancing.
This result fails for meshed networks (see Section 6.2).
5.2 Retrading transmission contracts
The equilibrium just computed was for a one-shot transmission auction. The fact that trans-
mission contracts act as a commitment device raises the question whether it might be profitable
for generators to increase their holding of transmission contracts after the initial auction (or buy
from those who hold contracts if there is no auction). As in Section 3 the change in profits if a
generator buys an additional ∆i transmission contracts is:
∆πbuyi = π
spot
ki+∆i
− πspotki −∆i (c2 − p1,ki+∆i) ,
=
∆i
n+ 1
(
(n− 1) (p1,ki − c1)−
n
α
∆i
n+ 1
)
. (28)
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Buying additional transmission contracts is unprofitable for a monopolist (n = 1), because he has
to pay the higher ex-post price. However, in an oligopoly setting (n > 1) buying additional small
quantities of contracts ∆i <
α
n
(
n2 − 1) (p1,ki − c1) is profitable for all generators as long as the
price-cost margin p1,ki − c1 is positive. Oligopolists have the advantage that by buying contracts
they commit to higher output, inducing competitors to reduce their output. The reduction of
competitors’ output has a positive impact on profits, which is not present in the monopoly case.
If several trading periods exist, then traders anticipate that oligopolists will buy additional
transmission contracts in subsequent periods. The value of transmission contracts rises with the
total amount held by generators and traders therefore charge a high price starting with the first
sale. Consider the change of profits for a generator buying ∆i contracts when the remaining
contracts are bought by other generators and when traders charge the price corresponding to all
capacity held by generators:
∆πbuy ∆i at final price =
1
α (n+ 1)2
[K(K − 2Qcomp) + (n+ 1)∆i(Qcomp −K)] . (29)
If K < Qcomp then profit increases in the amount of transmission contracts a generator buys
and he will therefore buy as many contracts as possible. Participation of generators is guaranteed,
because if any generator obtains a large enough fraction of all contracts, then his profits are higher
than in a no-trade situation. As a result generators buy all contracts from traders, even though
their aggregate profit is reduced:
∑
∆π = −K ((n− 1)Qcomp +K2) /(α (n+ 1)2) .
The situation is similar to a Coasian durable goods monopolist. Generators find themselves
in the unenviable position of buying additional transmission contracts that mitigate their market
power (similar to the Coasian durable goods monopolist selling to traders thereby reducing his
exposure to spot prices and the incentive to exercise market power by withholding output). The
only equilibrium will be that the generators buy all available transmission contracts at the price
difference that corresponds to their holding all contracts, even in the original auction. If they
attempt to pay less in that auction, traders will anticipate profitable sales in the aftermarket and
will bid up the price to the final equilibrium price. Generators are therefore forced to commit
to the higher output associated with selling all transmission output forward. This outcome
corresponds to Allaz and Vila’s (1993) result for n ≤ 2 that with additional periods of trading of
forward contracts the equilibrium outcome in the energy market gets closer to the competitive
outcome.
ForK > Qcomp a generator’s profit (29) decreases with the amount of transmission contracts
∆i he buys. Therefore no generator buys contracts at the ex-post price and traders have to offer
lower prices. Traders still benefit relative to a no-trade situation, because they capture some of
the profits (28) from generators. If ownership of contracts is dispersed, then each trader waits
for other traders to sell their contracts expecting to subsequently receive higher prices, but this
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deadlock prevents all trades. If ownership of transmission contracts is sufficiently concentrated
then traders sell all contracts to generators.
The example shows that allowing generators with market power to secure transmission
export contracts mitigates market power in a two-node network. As prices at the importing
node are fixed at full utilisation of transmission, the transmission market acts just like a long-
term contract market and induces generators to sell more energy than in a one-stage Cournot
model.
6 Market power in a three-node network
Joskow and Tirole (2000) conclude in their analysis of the three-node network that “the effects
of transmission contracts holding on market power on a three-node network are conceptually
similar to those on a two-node network”. This is no longer the case when assessing policy
options to mitigate market power, as the two-node network allows a very simple characterisation
of policy on transmission contracts to mitigate market power. Exporting generators should be
encouraged to trade for transmission (as often as possible) while importing generators should
be discouraged from obtaining transmission. The reason for the simplicity is that the market
price in a competitive region connected to an oligopolistic region by a constrained transmission
link is independent of who secures rights to that transmission link, so that the entire impact of
generator transmission contracts is in the region with the market power.
Matters are more complex in meshed networks where single link constraints do not neces-
sarily isolate other competitive markets from market power at a node. Section 6.3 shows that a
uniform auction for transmission contracts in the presence of complete information still ensures
that transmission contracts cannot enhance market power. If, however, transmission contracts
are inherited or secured in a ‘pay-as-bid’ auction (Section 6.4), then the policy conclusion from
the two-node network that only exporting generators should hold transmission contracts is no
longer sufficient to prevent the enhancement of market power. In Section 6.2 we show that
if the fraction of generator controlled supply sold into the oligopolistic market is increased by
transmission contracts, market power is enhanced, and vice versa.
6.1 Loop flow considerations
In a simple two-node network with a single link all power from one node must flow along the
single link to the other node. In a meshed network with more than one possible path from
one node to another, electricity will flow over all links, distributed according to Kirchoff’s Laws
(Bohn et.al. 1984). Thus in Figure 7, a generator at node two may sign a contract to deliver
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power to a consumer at node three, and then seek to sign a contract with the transmission
operator of the most direct link, 23, but only some of the power will actually flow along this
link, with the balance creating ‘loop flows’ along all other paths connecting the source (the
generator) to the sink (final consumer), in this case along 21 and 13. Dealing with these loop
flows bedevils the management of interconnected transmission systems, in which various sub-
grids of the interconnected system are under the jurisdiction of separate Transmission System
Operators (TSOs). One direct consequence of these loop flows is that a transmission constraint
on one link impacts on the flows that are possible on every electricity transmission link in
the network. Two different approaches have been proposed to explicitly address transmission
constraints and allocate scarce transmission capacity in a liberalised electricity market: property
rights and nodal prices.
First, property rights allocate physical transmission capacity either on a constrained link
(flow-gate rights), or for transmission between two locations (point-to-point contracts) or in-
sertion and withdrawal at specified locations (entry/exit rights). Flow-gate rights require that
any energy trade is matched with individual property rights for each transmission constraint in
the network, and seem therefore infeasible in most real networks (Hogan, 2000). Point-to-point
contracts and entry/exit rights aggregate the underlying information to increase liquidity and
facilitate trading, but require a central system operator to define the aggregated rights based
on the fundamental flow-gate rights. These difficulties of aggregation are not addressed in this
paper, therefore it suffices to analyse flow-gate rights - the results also apply to point-to-point
contracts and entry/exit rights. In the flow-gate design the system operator calculates propor-
Competitive net
exporting market
Oligopoly
generation
Competitive net
importing market
1
3
2
K
Figure 7: Symmetric 3-node network with a single constraint
tionality factors γkij to determine what proportion of energy flow between injection node i and
offtake node j will pass over link k. The proportionality factor γkij is negative if the energy flow
goes in the opposite direction to the defined orientation of the link.5 A trader m multiplies the
power volumes qmij (positive amount of MW)
6 he wants to transmit between different nodes with
5The orientations are determined arbitrarily, and these will determine the signs of the factors γkij and hence
the consistency of the flow analysis.
6Energy is measured in MWh, while capacity is measured in MW. We define a unit of time during which flows
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the corresponding proportionality factor γkij. This determines how many flow-gate rights he has
to obtain for each link fk,m = γkijq
m
ij . The system operator can issue or auction (O’Neill et.al.
2000) a net amount of flow-gate rights
∑
m f
k,m up to the capacity Kk of the link and market
participants can subsequently trade these flow-gate rights.
In the second approach, nodal pricing, generators, traders and consumers submit energy bids
to a system operator, who is the central auctioneer. Each bid specifies a location in the network,
a quantity of energy to be offered or requested and a price. The system operator determines, de
facto simulating a market for flow-gate rights, the market clearing price at each node. Generators
receive the nodal price of their injection point while consumers pay the nodal price at the off-take
point. Nodal pricing can be interpreted as an interface to simplify the underlying market struc-
ture and reduce transaction costs to match physical transmission contracts to energy delivery.
If generators and consumers sign long-term energy contracts, then nodal pricing alone would
expose them to uncertainty about the difference in nodal prices between their locations. The
system operator can issue financial transmission contracts (FTCs), which pay the price difference
between two locations for a specified quantity of energy, thus facilitating long-term contracting
and providing a market signal for future transmission demand. The advantage of FTCs over
physical transmission contracts is that they can serve their hedging purpose even if aggregated
over larger areas and time periods - thereby increasing liquidity and reducing transaction costs.
Nodal pricing also exposes generators to more net-demand responsiveness, thereby reducing their
incentive to exercise market power (Neuhoff, 2003). For present purposes these differences are
ignored. If we assume that energy spot markets are perfectly liquid and allow for continuous
trading while physical transmission contracts can be easily reconfigured, then Joskow and Tirole
(2000) show that financial transmission contracts provide the same financial incentives to gen-
erators as do physical transmission contracts. Therefore the results for physical flow-gate rights
will directly translate to financial transmission contracts in a nodal pricing design.
6.2 Exporting generator holding transmission contracts
The following example demonstrates that in meshed networks exporting oligopolists may use
transmission contracts to enhance their market power. As before, the game is solved backwards,
first determining equilibrium prices in the energy market, and then determining the bidding
strategy of generators and traders in stage one. As in Joskow and Tirole (2000), a competitive
net exporting market is located at node one, an oligopoly at node two and competitive net
demand at node three (Figure 7).
As described in the previous section, market participants have to obtain flow-gate rights for
are constant, and the energy is then MW multipled by the time interval, taken here as 1 unit.
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the constrained link 13, if they want to transmit energy between any two nodes in the network.
Due to loop flows γ13 = 2/3 of electricity exports Q1 from node one and γ23 = 1/3 of exports
Q2 from node two pass along the constrained link 13. To sell one unit of energy from node two
to three, an oligopoly exporter therefore needs 1/3 of a unit of flow-gate on 13. To sell one unit
of energy from node one to node three, 2/3 of a unit of flow-gate rights on 13 is required. In this
particular network total exports are therefore constrained by:
2Q1 +Q2 ≤ 3K. (30)
The value η of transmission contracts to the flow-gate is proportional to the price difference
between nodes times the inverse of the proportion of flows between the nodes that goes along
the flow-gate, and this value defines the efficient arbitrage condition:
η =
3
2
(p3 − p1) = 3(p3 − p2). (31)
Assuming competitive constant marginal cost c1 at node one and linear demand p3 = A−Q1−Q2
at node three with intercept A and using binding constraint (30), (31) can be solved for p2 as a
function of p1 and p3:
p3 =
2A− 3K −Q2
2
; p2 =
c1
2
+
2A− 3K −Q2
4
. (32)
In the energy market oligopolist i at node 2 who produces qi with constant marginal costs c2
and who owns ki transmission contracts (flow-gate rights on 13, each of which allows him to sell
3 units from node 2 to 3) maximises the following profit function:
πspoti = (p2 − c2) qi + 3(p3 − p2) ki. (33)
Substituting p2 from (32) in (33) the FOC gives the optimal output choice:
qi =
2c1 − 4c2 + 2A− 3K +
∑
j 3kj
n+ 1
− 3ki ; (34)
πspot (ki) =
(
Qcomp +
∑
j 3kj
)2
4 (n+ 1)2
+ 3ki (c2 − c1) ;
Q2 =
n (2c1 − 4c2 + 2A− 3K)−
∑
j 3kj
n+ 1
.
The competitive output would be Qcomp = Limn→∞Q2 = 2c1 − 4c2 + 2A− 3K. Equation (34)
shows that ownership of transmission contracts ki causes the oligopolist to decrease output qi. To
evaluate the effect of transmission contracts we can apply the First Welfare theorem according to
which the competitive equilibrium is efficient. The output in a situation with market power and
without transmission contracts is reduced relative to the competitive output by the factor n
n+1 .
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If generators own transmission contracts, then their market power is enhanced and they reduce
the output by an additional 1n+1
∑
j 3kj . As all other nodes are competitive, increased deviation
from the efficient level at the distorted node increases inefficiency. It follows, as J&T already
showed for the monopoly case, that holding transmission contracts by the exporter can decreases
welfare. Whereas in the two-node network only transmission contracts held corresponding to
imports enhance market power, in the meshed network even transmission contracts corresponding
to exports can enhance market power.
6.3 Effect of single price auction
The next step is to see whether there is any danger of the exporter acquiring market power
enhancing contracts in an auction. As before, there are no problems with a uniform price
auction, which will reveal all information and therefore result in arbitrage of prices. Generators
chose the proportion of transmission contracts to buy ki in order to maximise total profits
πauctioni = π
spot(ki) − 3ki (p3 − p2). The first order condition gives the total quantity to be
obtained:
3ki =
1− n
1 + n2
Qcomp ≤ 0.
In a uniform price auction the oligopolist buys in equilibrium a negative quantity of transmission
contracts, therefore market power is mitigated to the same degree as calculated for the two-
node network in section (5.1). Note that this requires the System Operator to ensure that the
oligopolists indeed acts to relieve the constraint, and allows additional flow-gate rights to be
issued to other participants (the arithmetical or directional sum over all contracts is the binding
constraint). If negative quantities of flow-gate rights are not available, then generators will buy
no transmission contracts and the result that market power is not enhanced if transmission
contracts are auctioned in a uniform price auction survives. The following theorem summarising
these more general results is proved in appendix (F).
Theorem 9 If constrained transmission capacity in a meshed network is sold in a single price
auction that is efficiently arbitraged by traders who can accurately predict future equilibrium spot
prices, then oligopolists will only acquire contracts that mitigate market power. Marginal costs
of generation should not increase by more than
(√
2− 1) times demand slope. If generators are
asymmetric, then marginal costs of each generator should not increase by more than 1/n times
demand slope (lower bounds due to approximations).
These conditions should be easily satisfied, because electricity demand is very inelastic (de-
mand slope high) while marginal costs of generators that can alter their output decision are
comparatively flat.
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If transmission contracts are formulated as options and not as obligations, then generators
cannot acquire a negative quantity of transmission contracts. If negative quantities would miti-
gate market power, then generators will end up not acquiring any transmission contracts. This is
the reason for the weak formulation in theorem (9) that transmission contracts will not enhance
market power. If transmission contracts are formulated as obligations than they will mitigate
market power if allocated in a uniform price auction with full information.
6.4 Pay-as-bid auction
If oligopolists only buy negative transmission contracts in a single price auction, would a pay-
as-bid auction allow them to secure transmission and enhance market power by playing a mixed
strategy, as in the two-node example? As before, the first step is to see if an oligopolist would
increase profits by buying transmission contracts at the value the contracts have if traders do
not expect oligopolists to obtain contracts:
∆πauctionk = π
spot
ki
− πspotki=0 − 3ki (p3,k=0 − p2,k=0) ,
=
1
4α
3ki
(n+ 1)2
(3ki − (n− 1)Qcomp) .
As in the two-node case (E.1), the ratio between transmission capacity 3ki and (n− 1)Qcomp
determines whether generators can profitably bid for market power-enhancing contracts when
information asymmetry prevents perfect arbitrage. However, in the three-node case oligopolists
(n > 1) are more likely to play a mixed strategy equilibrium than in the two node case. This is
because in the meshed network export capacity from node two is three times the transmission
capacity of the line 13. It is reflected in the factor 3ki instead of ki in the brackets. Mixed
strategy equilibria with their market power enhancing implications are therefore more likely in
meshed networks than in the two node case. In appendix (G) the mixed strategy equilibrium of
a monopolist in the three node network is calculated analogously to the situation in a two node
network.
6.5 Selling inherited contracts
Finally, it is important to see whether inherited transmission contracts enhance market power
or these additional distortions can be traded away. The oligopolist’s total profit function is
∆πsell∆ki = π
spot
ki−∆ki
− πspotki + 3∆ki (p3,ki−∆ki − p2ki−∆ki) ,
=
3∆ki
(n+ 1)2
((
n2 − 1) (p2,ki − c2)− n4α3∆ki) . (35)
The situation corresponds exactly to the two node network with an importing oligopolist inherit-
ing transmission contracts. The oligopolist could profitably sell small quantities of transmission
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contracts at the ex-post price. However, traders will not buy contracts as they anticipate that
further sales by oligopolists would further reduce the value of their contracts and we return to
the same discussion we presented for the two node network.
6.6 Conclusion meshed Networks
We showed that in arbitrary meshed networks oligopoly generators can obtain market power en-
hancing contracts in a discriminatory price auction, whereas a perfectly arbitraged uniform price
auction with complete information only allocates market-power-mitigating contracts. The intu-
ition about auctions therefore does not differ from the two-node network. If the requirement of
complete information and perfect arbitrage of the uniform price auction is not satisfied, then the
policy suggested for the two-node network was to restrict generators to hold export transmission
contracts. In meshed networks this policy no longer suffices, because even export contracts from
the generation node can enhance market power if the price at the destination reacts strongly
to output changes of the generator. One solution is to define transmission contracts to a refer-
ence node that has a price least influenced by any generator’s output decision, e.g. node one in
our example. Generators should then be restricted to transmission contracts with this reference
node. Consumers and their representatives should then obtain transmission contracts from the
reference node onward. Such a policy minimises the risk that transmission contracts enhance
market power while ensuring that they provide risk hedging services and provide information for
network expansion.
7 Conclusions
Allowing generators with market power access to transmission auctions when transmission ca-
pacity is constrained may amplify or mitigate their market power. Regulators may therefore
wish to consider under what circumstances it would be desirable to prevent such generators from
securing or retaining transmission contracts. We find that in the two-node case if the generators
with market power are located at an import constrained node, it is always undesirable to allow
them to retain existing transmission contracts. If they are to be compensated, it should be by
a formula that does not depend on the subsequently realised spot price, to make sure that they
have no additional reasons for influencing that price. It is also undesirable to allow them access
to the transmission auction where this is pay-as-bid, or where there is likely to be asymmetric
information favouring the generators. Even under the ideal circumstances of perfectly informed
arbitrageurs and a single-price auction, while there may be no harm in allowing generators to
bid, there is also no benefit. Nor do the generators benefit from bidding even in the pay-as-bid
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case, as all the additional distortionary revenue is secured by the transmission company.7 On
the other hand, if the generators with market power are located at an export constrained node,
their bids for transmission capacity allow them to pre-commit to additional output and reduce
prices at the exporting node, to the benefit of consumers there.
In a three-node network (and with more nodes), transmission contracts can enhance market
power even when they correspond to own production (and not just imports), at least if loop flows
imply that output changes have a bigger impact on the price at the delivery node than at the
origin node. One solution is to define transmission contracts to the reference node that has a
price least influenced by any generator’s output decision. Generators should then be restricted
to transmission contracts with this reference node. Consumers and their representatives should
then obtain transmission contracts from the reference node onward. Such a policy minimises
the risk that transmission contracts enhance market power while ensuring that they provide risk
hedging services and provide information for network expansion.
We analysed the effect of transmission contracts on output decisions when transmission
constraints are permanently binding. However, links between several regions are only constrained
part of the time with intermediate periods where the constraint is ‘just’ binding or ‘just’ not
binding. While there are several models showing that market power can increase the period
when constraints are binding, the effect of transmission contracts on whether or not constraints
are binding is still an open question.
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A Derivation of dependence of
∑
qi on
∑
ki with conjectured
supply function equilibria
If demand D = A− αp2, then the residual demand facing generator i is
qri = A−
∑
j =i
qj(p2)−K − αp2 = A−
∑
j =i
q0,j −K − (α+ (n− 1)τ) p2. (36)
If costs C (q) = c2q +
β
2 q
2 (linear marginal costs with slope β), profit is
πspoti (p2, ki) = q
r
i (p2 − c2 −
β
2
qri ) + ki (p2 − c1) .
Using the FOC with respect to p2 gives:
0 = (1 + β (α+ (n− 1)τ))
A−∑
j =i
q0,j −K − (α+ (n− 1)τ) p2
−(p2 − c2) (α+ (n− 1)τ)+ki,
Sum over all i:
0 = (1 + β (α+ (n− 1)τ))
(
n (A−K)− (n− 1)
∑
q0,j − n (α+ (n− 1)τ) p2
)
−n (p2 − c2) (α+ (n− 1)τ) +
∑
ki, (37)
and using (36) gives the equilibrium aggregate output:
∑
i
qi =
(
1 + τα
(
n− 2− αβ (1 + τα (n− 1))))n (A−K)
(1 + n) + αβ + τα (n+ αβ) (n− 1)
−
(
n+ (2n− 1)n τα + (n− 1)n2 τα2
)
αc2 +
(
1 + n τα
)∑
i ki
(1 + n) + αβ + τ
α
(n+ αβ) (n− 1) . (38)
The parameters are positive, hence total output
∑
i qi is decreasing in the amount of transmission
contracts held by generators,
∑
i ki.
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B Cournot case with retrading
Assume constant marginal costs, linear demand and Cournot competition (β = 0, τ = 0). From
(36) and (38):
qi =
A−K − αc2 +
n∑
j=1
kj
n+ 1
− ki, Q =
n (A−K − αc2)−
n∑
j=1
kj
n+ 1
,
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
kj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ K,
p2 =
A−K + nαc2 +
n∑
j=1
kj
α (n+ 1)
, Qcomp = A−K − αc2. (39)
Assume that a finite number R of well-defined trading periods exists. In retrading period r,
counting backward from the last retrading period 1, generator i sells ∆ri of his current holding of
transmission contracts kri . In subsequent periods each generator will sell additional transmission
contracts
∑r−1
j=1∆
r−j
i = Θ
r−1
i
(−−→
kr−1
)
, where Θr−1i is a function of the vector of all contract−−→
kr−1 =
−→
kr −−→∆r. The profit function generator i maximises in period r is therefore given by the
amount of transmission contracts sold in the subsequent periods at their ex-post market value,
plus the profits to be made in the energy market given the remaining transmission contracts.
As traders are rational and pay the expected price difference between the energy markets for
transmission contracts, the only influence of transmission contracts is via the pre-commitment
effect it has on the output choice qi and therefore also on the spot market price p2:
πri
(−→
kr,
−→
∆r
)
=
(
p2
[−→
kr −−→∆r −
−−−→
Θr−1
(−→
kr −−→∆r
)]
− c2
)
qi
[−→
kr −−→∆r −
−−−→
Θr−1
(−→
kr −−→∆r
)]
+
(
p2
[−→
kr −−→∆r −
−−−→
Θr−1
(−→
kr −−→∆r
)]
− c1
)
ki,
Substituting energy spot price p2 and quantities qi from (39) gives
πri
(−→
kr,
−→
∆r
)
= (c2 − c1)kri +
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
(
krj −∆rj −Θr−1j
(−→
kr −−→∆r
))
α (n+ 1)
∗

Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
(
krj −∆rj −Θr−1j
(−→
kr −−→∆r
))
n+ 1
+∆ri +Θ
r−1
i
(−→
kr −−→∆r
) ,
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and therefore the optimal amount of transmission contracts to be sold is given by the FOC with
respect to ∆ri :
0 =
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
(
krj −∆rj −Θr−1j
(−→
kr −−→∆r
))
α (n+ 1)
∗
 2
n+ 1
n∑
j=1
∂Θr−1j
(−→
kr −−→∆r
)
∂kri
−Θ′r−1i
(−→
kr −−→∆r
)
+
n− 1
n+ 1

+
n∑
j=1
∂Θ′r−1j
(−→
kr−
−→
∆r
)
∂kri
− 1
α (n+ 1)
(
∆ri +Θ
r−1
i
(−→
kr −−→∆r
))
. (40)
This can be solved in special cases.
B.1 Only one generator i holds transmission contracts
If kj = 0 for all j = i and generators do not buy negative quantities of contracts, then ∆rj = 0.
We can simplify notation k = kj , ∆
r = ∆ri so (40) becomes
0 =
n− 1
n+ 1
Qcomp + kr −∆r −Θr−1 (kr −∆r)
α (n+ 1)
(
1−Θ′r−1 (kr −∆r)) (41)
+
Θ′r−1 (kr −∆r)− 1
α (n+ 1)
(
∆ri +Θ
r−1 (kr −∆r)) .
(41) is either satisfied if
Θ′r−1 (kr −∆r) = 1, (42)
or if
∆r +Θr−1 (kr −∆r) = n− 1
2n
(Qcomp + k
r) . (43)
In the last period r = 1 we have Θr−1 (kr −∆r) = 0 and (43) gives ∆1 = n−12n
(
Qcomp + k
1
)
,
implying
Θ1
(
k2 −∆2) = ∆2 +∆1 = ∆2 + n− 1
2n
(
Qcomp + k
2 −∆2) , (44)
=
n− 1
2n
(
Qcomp + k
2
)− n+ 1
2n
∆2.
In the period r = 2 (43) gives:
∆2 +Θ1
(
k2 −∆2) = n− 1
2n
(
Qcomp + k
2
)
. (45)
Substituting (44) in gives
∆2 =
n+ 1
2n
∆2,
and therefore ∆2 = 0 for n > 1. Applying similar arguments ∆r = 0 for r > 2. The single
holder of transmission contracts will only sell rights in the last period. This corresponds to the
monopolist in Allaz and Vila (1993) not falling into the forward selling trap.
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B.2 Assume all generators hold transmission contracts
Solving (40) for the last retrading period r = 1 we know that subsequently no further rights can
be resold Θr−1j,i
(−→
kr −−→∆r
)
= 0. This implies that
∆1i =
Qcomp + n∑
j=1
(
k1j −∆1j
) n− 1
n+ 1
. (46)
Summing (46) over all i and resubstituting the expression for
n∑
j=1
∆1i gives
Θ1i
(−→
k1
)
= ∆1i =
Qcomp + n∑
j=1
k1j
 n− 1
n2 + 1
. (47)
A similar argument shows that 8
Θ2i
(−→
k2
)
= n
n− 1
1− n2 + n3 + n
Qcomp + n∑
j=1
k2j
 . (52)
(47) and (52) show that we can write
Θri
(−→
kr
)
= θr
Qcomp + n∑
j=1
krj
 ,
where 0 ≤ θr ≤ 1, and that generators will sell the same amount of transmission contracts ∆ri =
∆rj . This simplification depends on equal and constant marginal costs. Further substitutions give
8Using (47) in (40) for r = 2 gives and
−→
k1 =
−→
k2 −
−→
∆2 gives:
∆2i +Θ
1
i
(−→
k
2 −
−→
∆2
)
=
(
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
(
k
2
j −∆
2
j −Θ
1
j
(−→
k
2 −
−→
∆2
)))
n
n− 1
n+ 1
, (48)
and therefore
∆2i =
(n− 1)2
1 + n2
(
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
(
k
2
j −∆
2
j
))
. (49)
The number of transmission rights sold ∆2i is again symmetric independent of kj (the lhs is the same for all i):
∆2i =
(n− 1)2
1− n2 + n3 + n
(
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
k
2
j
)
, (50)
Therefore
Θ2i
(−→
k
2
)
= ∆1i
(−→
k
2 −∆2i
)
+∆2i
(−→
k
2
)
(51)
= n
n− 1
1− n2 + n3 + n
(
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
k
2
j
)
.
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a recursive relation for θr:9
θr = θr−1 +
(
1− nθr−1) n− 1− 2θr−1
n2 − 2nθr−1 + 1 . (54)
θr is increasing in r towards the limit of limr→∞ θ
r = 1/n. Assuming that netting is possible, and
generators can buy export contracts, then in the limit generators in aggregate have sold all market
power enhancing export contracts and replace these by contracts to mitigate market power such
that they have all their output contracted forward. If netting is not allowed generators will
substitute the remaining fraction of transmission contracts they would like to buy by financial
hedging contracts signed with a third party. If third parties are not available to sign such
contracts, then θr is limited to the amount of hedging contracts available:
θr ≤ 1
n
K +
n∑
j=1
kj
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
kr
∀r = 1..R.
C Continuous retrading
Proposition 10 It is profitable to sell contracts if n −m people sold before and all others will
follow for m ≤
√
Qcomp
k
(√
(n+ 1) + Qcomp
k
−
√
Qcomp
k
)
while it is not profitable to sell contracts
if every one else follows for m >
√
Qcomp
k
(√
(n+ 1) +
Qcomp
k −
√
Qcomp
k
)
.
Proof. Let ∆πsl,j be the profit for a generator from selling all k transmission contracts if l
generators sold before and j generators, including the one assessed, will subsequently sell. Let
πs,y be profits of a generator if he sells (s=1) or retains (s=0) his transmission contracts and a
total of y generators sell.
∆πsl,j = π1,l+j − π0,l
= (pl+j − c2) qs=1,l+j + (pl+j − c1) k
− ((pl − c2) qs=0,l + (pl − c1)k)
9Substituting in (40) gives:
∆ri =
n− 1− 2θr−1
n2 + 1− 2nθr−1
(
Qcomp +
n∑
j=1
k
r
j
)
. (53)
Using the definition of of Θr:
Θr (kr) = ∆r +Θr−1
(
n∑
j=1
k
r
j − n∆
r
i
)
,
or θr respectively and substitute ∆ri from (53) we obtain (54).
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Substituting p and q10 from (39) gives11
∆πsl,j = πs,l+j − π0,l
=
k
α (n+ 1)2
((n+ 1− 2j)Qcomp + ((n+ 1− 2j) (n− l) + (j − n− 1) j)k) (55)
We want to know the max m for which ∆πsn−m,n > 0. Using (55) and setting l = n −m and
j =m gives:
(n+ 1− 2m)Qcomp −m2k > 0,
which is satisfied for
m ≤
√
Qcomp
k
(√
(n+ 1) +
Qcomp
k
−
√
Qcomp
k
)
. (56)
If we assume that import capacity K does not exceed competitive local generation capacity
Q then the minimum value for
Qcomp
k is n and therefore for n = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 generators m +
1 = 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4 generators will retain their transmission contracts. If we assume instead that
transmission contracts are only a small fraction of total output, Qcomp
k
→∞ then (56) turns to
m < n+12 and therefore a slightly larger fraction of generators m+ 1 = 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5 will retain
transmission contracts.
Proposition 11 Assume m + 1 + h generators hold contracts, then it is profitable for one of
these generators to sell his contracts, if subsequently m + 1 generators retain contracts as long
as h <
√
Qcomp
k + (m+ 1)
(√
Qcomp
k +m+ n+ 2−
√
Qcomp
k + (m+ 1)
)
.
Proof. Setting l = n−m− 1− h and j = h in (55) gives ∆πsl,j > 0 for
h <
√
Qcomp
k
+ (m+ 1)
(√
Qcomp
k
+m+ n+ 2−
√
Qcomp
k
+ (m+ 1)
)
(57)
10
py =
Qcomp + (n− y)k
α (n+ 1)
+ c2
qs,y =
Qcomp + (n− y)k
n+ 1
− (1− s) k
11
=
1
α
(
A−K − αc2 + (n− l) k
n+ 1
−
jk
n+ 1
)(
A−K − αc2 + (n− l)k
n+ 1
−
jk
n+ 1
)
+
(
−jk
α (n+ 1)
)
k
−
1
α
(
A−K − αc2 + (n− l)k
n+ 1
)(
A−K − αc2 + (n− l) k
n+ 1
− k
)
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Calculating again the lower bound based on the previously calculated m and assuming that
k = Qcomp
n
we obtain for n = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 that h = 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3.
For n ≤ 7 we obtain the result that the first generators will always sell their transmission
contracts because m + h + 1 ≥ n. For n = 8 the m + h + 1 = 7 and therefore it is not
profitable for the first generator to sell his transmission contracts. As any one generator makes
the same calculation no generator will sell his transmission contracts. The development is slightly
unregular due to the integer effects, such that for n = 9 the first generator again sells his contracts,
whereas for 10 ≤ n ≤ 14 again no generator sells. For n > 14 we obtain that m+ h+2 < n and
therefore one could expect that the the first generators sell, until m+ h+ 2 generators are left
with contracts.
Proposition 12 If additional sales are always possible and netting is inhibited, then less than
half of symmetric generators will sell their market power enhancing transmission contracts.
D Pay-as-bid auction equilibrium
Joskow and Tirole (2000) analysed a ‘pay-as-bid’ auction for a monopoly generator buying trans-
mission contracts and we replicate their equations (1) and (2) in equations (58) and (62). We
first consider the mixed strategy equilibrium for the monopoly case and derive the equilibrium
with n Nash-Cournot oligopolists in Appendix E.
As before, we assume that traders perfectly arbitrage any profit opportunity. Let km(η) be
the monopolist’s bid schedule. Following Joskow and Tirole, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
which satisfies the condition that traders make on expectation non-negative profits is defined by
two functions. The first is the distribution functionH(.) from which the monopolist draws his bid
schedule η ǫ (η, η) with Prob(η ≤ x) = H(x). The second is the aggregate bid function of traders,
kt (η), where kt (η) + km (η) = K. The generator secures max(0,K − kt (η)). The distribution
function H(.) has to ensure that traders make zero expected profit and the equilibrium bid
schedule of traders has to satisfy the condition that the monopolist is indifferent between choosing
any η from the support (η, η) of H(.).
D.1 Equilibrium bid schedule of traders
The profit of the monopolist consists of profit in the energy market minus the cost of buying
transmission contracts. Because the monopolist’s capacity purchase is always the difference
between total capacity and the traders’ bid schedule, we have:
πauctionm (K − kt(η)) =
(Qcomp +K − kt(η))2
4α
+ (K − kt(η))(c2 − c1 − η). (58)
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For the monopolist to be indifferent between any η, his profit must be constant as η changes.
Setting the first derivative to zero gives
∂kt(η)
∂η
= −
[
K − kt(η)
Qcomp+2α(c2−c1)
2α +
km(η)
2α − η
]
= −
[
K − kt(η)
η0 +
1
2αkm − η
]
, (59)
where η0 is the value of transmission contracts for traders when the monopolist does not own
contracts. The solution of the differential equation (59) is
kt(η) = K − 2α
(
η − η0 +
√
(η − η0)2 −
K
2
const1
)
. (60)
D.2 Equilibrium monopoly bid distribution function
The distribution H(·) is such that traders make zero profit if and only if their aggregate bid
schedule is the one calculated in (60). The expected value of a marginal bid equals the integral
over all bids by the monopolist that are lower than the bid price η of the trader, weighted with
their probability:
E [vt (η)] =
∫ η
η
H′ (η˜) (p2(η˜)− p1 − η)dη˜.
As profit has to be zero for all η, the change in profit also has to be zero:
∂
∂η
E [vt (η)] = H′ (η) (p2(η)− p1 − η)−H (η) ≡ 0. (61)
The upper support of the bids is η with H (η) = 1. Solving (61) gives
H (η) = exp
[
−
∫ η
η
1
p2(η˜)− p1 − η˜ dη˜
]
. (62)
Substituting linear demand p2 from (36), assuming Cournot competition (τ = 0), and km(η) =
K − kt(η) from (60) into (62) we obtain
H (η) = exp
−∫ η
η
1√
(η˜ − η0)2 − K2 const1
dη˜
 = η − η0 +
√
(η − η0)2 − K2 const1
η − η0 +
√
(η − η0)2 − K2 const1
. (63)
At the lower end of the support η, H(η) = 0. This gives us η− η0+
√(
η − η0
)2 − K2 const1 = 0,
which is only satisfied for η = η0 and const1 = 0. We therefore obtain:
k(η) = 4α (η − η0) , η = η0 +
K
4α
, H′ (η) = 4α
K
. (64)
E Mixed strategy Equilibrium in Oligopoly Case
An oligopoly with n > 1 generators is located at the importing node. In a ”pay-as-bid” auction
any generator will either not participate in the auction or buy all transmission contracts available.
Bids are chosen from a continuous distribution, therefore no more than one generator obtains
transmission contracts.
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E.1 Energy market
To simplify our subsequent calculations we define η as the margin paid above the value trans-
mission contracts take if generators own no contracts. We know from (39) that if a generator
owns k contracts then the value of contracts is increased due to the decrease in output:
∆p2,k =
k
α (n+ 1)
. (65)
With retrading generators sell subsequently ∆ = min(n−12n (Qcomp + k) , k) of their transmission
contracts. As we will later confirm ∆ < k, so we can write the price increase as a function of the
number of transmission contracts bought in the auction:
∆p2,k,r =
k
2nα
− n− 1
2nα (n+ 1)
Qcomp. (66)
The change in profits for a generator buying k transmission contracts is, using (39):
∆πchangek = qi,k (p2,k − c2)− qi,0 (p2,0 − c2) +∆p2,kk (67)
=
k
α (n+ 1)2
(k − (n− 1)Qcomp) ,
and if the generator resells contracts the expression is:
∆πchangek,r =
1
4αn (n+ 1)2
((n+ 1)k − (n− 1)Q)2 . (68)
If no retrading is feasible, then generator only profitably obtain contracts at the price contracts
have if no generator owns contracts, if k > (n− 1)Qcomp (67). If the generator can sell some
of these contracts at the ex-post price, then it is profitable for the generator even if he obtains
fewer contracts k > n−1n+1Qcomp at the price which contracts take if no generator holds such
contracts.(68). The generator can resell some of the contracts he obtained at higher prices,
assuming that traders trust or market design ensures that he will not resell additional contracts
in subsequent periods.
Similarly the change in profits ∆πchange−k is calculated for a generator assuming a competing
generator obtains contracts:
∆πchange−k = qi,−k (p2,k − c2)− qi,0 (p2,0 − c2) (69)
=
1
α
k
(n+ 1)2
(k + 2Qcomp) ,
and if the competing generator resells some of his contracts:
∆πchange−k,r =
((n+ 1) k − (n− 1)Q)
4αn (n+ 1)2
((n+ 1) k + (3n+ 1)Q) . (70)
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E.2 Game structure
The game with an oligopoly of generators is the same as with a monopolist. Generators and
traders submit their bid schedule and the auctioneer accepts the highest bids. Generators either
submit no bid or bid for all transmission contracts available at price η. Generators draw the bid
price η from the interval [η, η] with probability Prob(η < x) = H(x). As the interval is continuous
the probability that more than one generator submits a bid of the same price is zero.
E.3 Distribution from which generators draw their bids
We now calculate the aggregate density function H(η) describing the probability H ′(η) with
which a generators chooses a bid η. The generator decides on the distribution function H(η)
such that he can ensure that all traders make zero profits if and only if the aggregate bid schedule
of traders is 1− k (η).
Generators can only profitably bid if they obtain a significant positive quantity of transmis-
sion contracts and hence H(0) > 0 and H(η) = H(0) for ηǫ[0, η].
The expected value vt (η) of marginal bid by a trader is zero if the bid is not accepted. If
the bid is accepted, then vt (η) is the weighted integral over price increase minus bid price:
E [vt (η)] =
∫ η
η
nH(η˜)n−1H ′(η˜)∆p2,kdη˜ −H(η)nη ηǫ(η, η). (71)
After substituting ∆p2,k from (65) (or (66) for the case with retrading) we differentiate the right
hand side with respect to η. The left hand side is zero, because profits for all trades are zero
and therefore also the differential is zero. Rearranging we obtain for the case without and with
retrading:
H ′(η)
H(η)
=
1
n
α (n+ 1)
k − ηα (n+ 1)
H ′r(η)
Hr(η)
=
2α
k − n−1(n+1)Qcomp − 2nαη
. (72)
Setting η = η in (71) gives E
[
vt
(
η
)]
= −H(η)nη. Traders submitting bids at η > 0 would make
a loss, therefore we conclude that η = 0.
E.4 Traders’ aggregate bid schedule
We now calculate which distribution of bid function 1− k (η) of traders ensures that generators
will be indifferent between not bidding or bidding any value on the interval [η, η]. Generator’s
expected profits when submitting a bid (η,K) consist of the profits of winning, given by the
probability that other generators bid lower H (η)n−1 times profits minus costs for transmission
contracts. Furthermore we add the weighted profits made when other generators obtain trans-
mission contracts and therefore reduce their output and push up prices. All these profits have
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to equal the profits from not participating in the auction:
H (η)n−1
[
∆πk(η) − ηk (η)
]
+
∫ η
η
(n− 1)H(η˜)n−2H ′(η˜)∆π−k(η˜)dη˜
=
∫ η
η
(n− 1)H(η˜)n−2H ′(η˜)∆π−k(η˜)dη˜. (73)
Differentiation (73) with respect to η and then substituting H ′() from (72) and ∆π’s from (67)
and (70) provided a differential equation to describe k(η):
∂k
∂η
= α (n+ 1)2 k
1 + n−1n
Qcomp+α(n+1)η
k−ηα(n+1)
2k − α (n+ 1)2 η + (1− n)Qcomp
. (74)
For the case with retrading, substitute (68) and (70) in (73) and differentiate with respect to η
to obtain:
∂kr
∂η
= 2αn
(
2n−1
n+1Qcomp + k
)(
k − n−1(n+1)Qcomp
)
− 2αηk(
k − n−1(n+1)Qcomp − 2nαη
)2 . (75)
E.5 Boundary conditions
We require that at the upper end of the density function H(η) = 1 a generator buys all trans-
mission rights k (η) = K. If k(η) > K then generators could already obtain all transmission
contracts for a lower η′ and therefore they will not submit any bids above η′ and therefore
H(η′) = 1 for η′ < η. If on the other hand k(η) < K, then a generator increasing his bid to η+ ε
would obtain all transmission contracts. This would be a profitable deviation.
From (71) we know that η = 0 and to ensure that generators are indifferent between bidding
and not bidding we require ∆πchange
k(η) = 0, which defines k(η) as k(η) =
n−1
n+1Qcomp in the case of
no retrading and kr(η) =
1
n+1Qcomp in the case of retrading.
E.6 Numerical Example
A numerical example demonstrates the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium. With para-
meter values n = 2, α = 1, K = 3 and Qcomp = 3/2 the differential equations (72) and (74)
are:
∂k (η)
∂η
=
9
2
k
4k − 6η + 3
(k − 3η) (4k − 18η − 3) ,
∂H (η)
∂η
=
1
2
H(η)
1
3k − η
,
and in the case with retrading (72) and (75) are
∂kr (η)
∂η
=
16k2 + 4k − 40ηk − 6
(1 + 8η − 2k)2 ,
∂Hr (η)
∂η
=
4H(η)
2k − 1− 8η .
12
This can be solved numerically and results for one example are presented in Figure 5.
12The denominator of ∂Hr(η)
∂η
approaches zero for k− > 1
2
, making it necessary to perform the numerical
integration starting from positive η.
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E.7 Stability
We calculated a Nash equilibrium, which requires stability given other players’ bid functions. To
check for stability or existence of this equilibrium it should not be profitable for a generator to
announce not to participate in the auction. An announced deviation could be profitable even
if the previous analysis determined a Nash equilibrium, because other players change their bid
functions following the announcement.
The intuitive argument why such a deviation is not profitable goes as follows. To a first
order, all generators are indifferent between bidding and not bidding, therefore the remaining
generators increase their bidding probability by 1/n. Traders do not observe any difference
because the aggregate distribution of bids stays the same and so they maintain their bidding
strategy.
Generators, however, observe a second order effect. If they do not bid, then the probability
that someone else will bid has been reduced by 1/n2 and therefore the expected profit has been
reduced. If they bid a low price, then the probability that someone else bids a higher price has
likewise been reduced by 1/n2, once again resulting in a reduction of expected revenue, but by
less than 1/n2. Only if generators bid the maximum price could profit stay the same as before.
Therefore generators will submit high bids more frequently. As a result the profits for traders
increase. However, we assume perfect arbitrage, therefore additional traders will submit bids.
These additional bids reduce the amount of transmission contracts generators can obtain for a
given price and therefore the profits of generators. As a result the high bids become less profitable
for generators. So generators reaction to the second order effect pushes up revenue for low bids
while at the same time traders’ reaction reduces revenue for the high bids until generators are
indifferent between no, low and high bids. Overall profits for generators are reduced, but by not
more than 1/n2. This shows that the deviation strategy is not profitable for generators.
F Uniform price auction in meshed networks
We first give the direct proof for a symmetric generators with constant marginal costs (Lemma
13) and then the extended version for asymmetric players with increasing marginal costs (Lemma
14 and following).
Lemma 13 If constrained transmission capacity in a meshed network is sold on a single price
auction that is efficiently arbitraged by traders who can accurately predict future equilibrium spot
prices, then symmetric oligopolists with constant marginal costs will only acquire contracts that
mitigate market power.
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Proof. Assume that the set of transmission constraints that is binding does not change with
the allocation of transmission contracts and that market power is only exercised at one node. As
all transmission constraints stay binding and demand is linear, prices are some linear function of
demand. Assume the oligopoly generators are located at node 2 with constant marginal costs c2.
Oligoplist i produces qi, and total production at node 2 is Q. Oligopolists sell to node 3, where
the price is p3 (which can be several nodes, in which case p3 is a linear combination of prices
of several nodes). Prices at node 3 depend on constant competitive production costs, subsumed
into A3, and on output at node 2, where α3 can be positive, zero or negative:
p2 = A2 − α2Q; p3 = A3 − α3Q. (76)
In the energy market the oligopolist owning ki transmission contracts maximises the profit func-
tion:
πspoti = (p2 − c2) qi + (p3 − p2) kiθ, (77)
where θ is the ratio of the amount that can be sold to node 3 to the underlying flow-gate rights
(θ = 3 in (33)). The FOC gives the optimal output choices in the energy market:
qi =
A2 − c2 − (α2 − α3)
∑
kiθ
α2 (n+ 1)
+
α2 − α3
α2
kiθ; Q =
n (A2 − c2) + (α2 − α3)
∑
kiθ
(n+ 1)α2
. (78)
This allows the determination of energy market profits as a function of transmission contracts.
In a uniform price auction competitive arbitrageurs will ensure that the market clearing price
for transmission contracts will equal the value of these rights in the energy auction (p3 − p2). A
generator chooses the number of transmission contracts he bids for in the auction to maximise
profits in the energy auction πenergy minus the costs he incurs to buy the rights, (p3 − p2) kiθ.
πauctioni = π
spot(ki)− (p3 − p2) kiθ
=
A2 − c2 − (α2 − α3)
∑
kiθ
(n+ 1)
(
A2 − c2 − (α2 − α3)
∑
kiθ
α2 (n+ 1)
+
α2 − α3
α2
kiθ
)
.
Calculating the first order condition with respect ki, using symmetry between all generators and
resubstituting in 78 gives:13∑
kiθ =
n2 − n
1 + n2
A2 − c2
α2 − α3 ; Qtransmission_rights =
n2
1 + n2
A2 − c2
α2
.
If output reductions of generators increase prices at the original node more than at the destination
node of the transmission contract (α2 > α3), then generators will buy a positive quantity of
transmission contracts (corresponding to an export contract), otherwise a negative quantity.
13We assume that less transmission contracts than available capacity are obtained by generators (|
∑
λi| < K).
Otherwise the argumentation parallel to section (5.1) shows that generators pre-empt all available transmission
capacity mitigating market power.
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The result can be compared with the output choice Qcomp =
A2−c2
α2
in a competitive scenario
(n→∞), and with the output Qno_tr in a situation without transmission contracts (ki = 0 ∀i).
Qno_tr =
n
n+ 1
Qcomp < Qtransmission_rights =
n2
1 + n2
Qcomp < Qcomp.
As all nodes but node two are competitive, the only deadweight loss will occur due to withholding
at node two. Deadweight losses are reduced if generators’ market power is mitigated and they
withhold less output, as demonstrated. Therefore transmission contracts allocated through a
uniform auction are efficiency improving.
To generalise the previous lemma to allow for asymmetric generators and increasing marginal
costs we require an indirect proof. Lemma 15 calculates output choice in the energy market.
Aggregate output is an increasing function of the weighted sum of transmission contract holding.
We therefore have to show that this weighed sum is positive to prove that market power is
mitigated. Lemma 16 gives the FOC for the transmission contracts auction. Lemma 17 shows
that the LHS of the FOC is positive and Lemma 18 proves that the weighted sum of transmission
contracts holdings is positive given conditions on the slope the marginal cost curve. These
conditions should be easily satisfied, because electricity demand is very inelastic (demand slope
high) while marginal costs of generators that can alter their output decision are comparatively
flat.
Lemma 14 If constrained transmission capacity in a meshed network is sold in a single price
auction that is efficiently arbitraged by traders who can accurately predict future equilibrium spot
prices, then oligopolists will only acquire contracts that mitigate market power. Marginal costs
of generation should not increase by more than
(√
2− 1) times demand slope. If generators are
asymmetric, then marginal costs of each generator should not increase by more than 1/n times
demand slope (lower bounds due to approximations).
Proof. We maintain the demand structure (76) but change the production cost incurred by
generators from C(qi) = cqi to C(qi) = ciqi − βi2 q2i . This allows the representation of the local
shape of any cost curve.
The proof strategy is to show that the LHS of equation (80), which follows below, is positive
if generators are symmetric (because c = ci) or if generators are asymmetric and ∀i βi ≤ α2/n
(Lemma 17). From Lemma (16) follows that the RHS of (80) is positive and using Lemma (80)
and ∀i βi ≤
√
2− 1 it follows that (α2 − α3)
∑ ki
α2+βi
is positive. Finally it follows from Lemma
(15) that aggregate output is increased relative to a scenario without transmission contracts and
therefore market power mitigated.
Lemma 15 Total output of generators is increasing with (α2 − α3) θ
∑ ki
α2+βi
.
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Proof. In the energy market the oligopolist owning ki transmission contracts maximises
the profit function
πspoti =
(
A2 − α2Q− ci − βi
2
qi
)
qi + (A3 −A2 + (α2 − α3)Q) kiθ.
The FOC gives the optimal output choice for a given allocation of transmission contracts ki:
Q =
A2
∑ 1
α2+βi
−∑ ci
α2+βi
+ (α2 − α3) θ
∑ ki
α2+βi
1 +
∑ α2
α2+βi
, (79)
qi =
A2 − α2Q− ci + (α2 − α3)kiθ
βi + α2
.
Iff
(α2 − α3) θ
∑ ki
α2 + βi
> 0
then aggregate output Q is increased according to (79) and therefore market power mitigated.
Lemma 16 The FOC in the transmission contracts auction, defining A =
∑ α2
α2+βi
and c =∑ ci
n , is
A
1 + nA
(n− 1) (A2 − c)−
∑
i
α2
α2 + βi
(c− ci)
= (α2 − α3) θ
(∑ (1 +A)2
1 + nA
βi
α2
ki +
∑ α2
α2 + βi
ki
)
. (80)
Proof. If transmission contracts are allocated in a uniform price auction, then prices are
arbitraged and ownership of transmission contracts only influences the output decision qi (ki) of
generators but does not directly influence the total profit function
πtotali =
(
A2 − α2Q− ci − βi
2
qi
)
qi. (81)
Substituting (79) in (81) and calculating the first order condition with respect to ki for
optimal transmission ownership gives:A2 +∑
j
α2 (cj − ci)
α2 + βj
− (α2 − α3) θ
∑
j
α2kj
α2 + βj
− ci

(
α2
2α2 + βi
−
α2
α2+βi
1 +
∑
l
α2
α2+βl
)
=
βi∑
j
α2
α2 + βj
+ βi + α2
α2
α2 + βi
 α2 − α3
2α2 + βi
kiθ. (82)
Multiplying (82) by (2α2 + βi)
1+A
1+nA and summing over i and defining A =
∑ α2
α2+βi
and
c =
∑ ci
n
we obtain (80).
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Lemma 17 The LHS of FOC (80) is positive if ∀i βi
α2
≤ 1/n .
Proof. Define f = maxi(
βi
α2
) with f ≤ 1/n. We have to show that the LHS of FOC (80) is
positive. The worst case scenario is that m small generators have high marginal costs ci = c0+cd
which are increasing with βi = fα2, while the remaining n−m generators have lower marginal
costs ci = c0 which are constant βi = 0. The condition for a positive LHS of FOC (80) can now
be written as:
A
1 + nA
(n− 1)
(
A2 − c0 − m
n
cd
)
−mn−m
n
cd
f
1 + f
> 0.
Using f = 1/n and reformating gives
A (n− 1) (A2 − c0 − cd) +
(
A (n− 1)− (1 + nA) m
n+ 1
)
n−m
n
cd > 0. (83)
For small generators to participate their marginal costs c0 + cd have to be such that demand is
positive at their marginal cost, and therefore A2 − c0 − cd > 0. We are left to show in (83) that
the parentheses of the second term is positive. Using A = n−m f1+f = n+n
2−m
1+n gives
nm2 − (n+ 2n2 + n3)m+ (n+ n2) (n2 − 1) > 0.
For m→±∞ the inequality is satisfied and the LHS is at the minimum for m = n+2n2+n32n > n.
As m has to be smaller than n we are left to show that the LHS is positive for maximum possible
m = (n− 1). In this case the LHS takes the form n (n− 1)2 > 0.
Lemma 18 (α2 − α3) θ
∑ α2
α2+βi
ki is positive if LHS of FOC (80) is positive and ∀i βiα2 ≤
√
2−1.
Proof. (by contradiction). Assume that
(α2 − α3) θ
∑ α2
α2 + βi
ki < 0. (84)
We know that the LHS of FOC (80) is positive, therefore the RHS is positive:
(α2 − α3) θ
(∑ (A+ 1)2
1 + nA
βi
α2
ki +
∑ α2
α2 + βi
ki
)
> 0. (85)
Inequality (84) and (85) can only be satisfied simultaneously if for some i with ki > 0 the
coefficient of ki in the first sum exceeds the coefficient in the second sum:
(A+ 1)2
1 + nA
βi
α2
>
α2
α2 + βi
or
βi
α2
α2 + βi
α2
>
1 + nA
(A+ 1)2
. (86)
Use f = maxi(
βi
α2
) to obtain a lower bound for A =
∑
i
α2
α2+βi
> n1+f . Apply the lower bound to
the RHS of (86), which is increasing in A, and the upper bound for βi to the LHS to obtain:
f (f + 1) >
1 + nn 11+f(
n 11+f + 1
)2 or f (n+ f + 1)2 > f + 1+ n2. (87)
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For our assumption to be true (87) requires that f is bigger than
n 2 3 4 6 ∞
f
√
2− 1 .52 .57 .61 1
.
If we assume that f <
√
2−1 then inequality (84) and (85) can not be satisfied simultaneously
when (α2 − α3) θ
∑ α2
α2+βi
ki is positive.
G Mixed-strategy equilibrium in three-node network
The result for the monopoly case is given here. The monopolist will offer to buy all contracts
available at price η. He draws η with from the distribution H() with probability H ′(η). The
aggregate bid function of traders does not change in equilibrium because additional bids make
losses while fewer bids provide an arbitrage opportunity. The monopolist therefore anticipates
the proportion of contracts k(η) he can obtain when bidding η in the auction. In Nash equilibrium
the monopolist should be indifferent between all prices and therefore indifferent between changing
the price of his bid. Subtract the costs for buying transmission contracts ηk from the profits in
the energy market (33) to obtain total profits:
∆πtotal (ki) =
(Qcomp + 3k)
2
4α (n+ 1)2
+ (c2 − c1) 3k − ηk. (88)
The first order condition (FOC) with respect to the bid price η gives
∂k(η)
∂η
=
k (η)
3
8αQcomp + 3(c2 − c1) + 98αk (η)− η
=
k (η)
η0
3 +
9
8αk (η)− η
. (89)
In (89), η0 is the value of transmission contracts for traders when the monopolist does not own
contracts. The solution of the differential equation is
k(η) =
η − η03 +
√(
η − η03
)2 − 9K8 const1
9
8α
. (90)
The traders’ strategy is determined from the no-arbitrage condition that requires all bids to make
zero expected profit. A bid is only accepted if the price is at least as high as the monopolist’s
bid. The expected profit from a bid equals the integral over all bids by the monopolist that are
lower than the bid price η of the trader, weighted with their probability:
E [πt(η)] =
∫ η
η
H′ (η˜) (3p3(η˜)− 3p2(η˜)− η)dη˜.
As profit has to be zero for all η, the change in profit also has to be zero:
∂
∂η
E [πt(η)] = H′ (η) (3p3(η)− 3p2(η)− η)−H (η) ≡ 0. (91)
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Differential equation (91) determines the probability with which the monopolist chooses bids for
a mixed strategy equilibrium to exist. The upper support of the bids is η withH (η) = 1. Solving
(91) gives
H (η) = exp
[
−
∫ η
η
1
3p3(η˜)− 3p2(η˜)− η˜ dη˜
]
. (92)
Substituting p2 and p3 from (32) and k() from (90) into (92) we obtain :
H (η) = exp
−∫ η
η
1√(
η˜ − η03
)2 − 9K8 const1dη˜
= η − η03 +
√(
η − η03
)2 − 9K8 const1
η − η03 +
√(
η − η03
)2 − 9K8 const1
At the lower support η, H(η) = 0. This gives η− η03 +
√(
η − η03
)2 − 9K8 const1 = 0, which is only
satisfied for η = η03 and const1 = 0. We therefore obtain:
k(η) =
16α
9
(
η − η0
3
)
, η =
η0
3
+
9K
16α
, H′ (η) = 16α
9K
. (93)
The mixed-strategy equilibrium is thereby described and looks similar to the one presented in
figure (4).
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